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JOHN DEWEY

THE MAN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY


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JOHN DEWEY

THE MAN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

Addresses Delivered in New York in Celebration of His Seventieth Birthday

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for the

Celebration of the Seventieth Birthday of

JOHN DEWEY

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THE great philosopher belongs to all the world. Desiring to share in the tribute that educators everywhere are paying to America's greatest philosopher of education, the Harvard Graduate School of Education sought from the National Committee to Honor John Dewey permission to assemble in this volume the addresses delivered at the recent celebration on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. The Committee graciously accorded its consent; and in this publication, therefore, Harvard has a modest part, with those other universities — Vermont, Johns Hopkins, Minnesota, Michigan, Chicago, Columbia — which have been more highly privileged to claim Professor Dewey for their own, in the beneficent work of spreading the light of his teaching. We sought this opportunity in order that we might give tangible evidence of our respect for Professor Dewey's contribution to the philosophy of education. So far as we, or any group of teachers anywhere, are teaching in his spirit, we are doing him yet higher honor.

HENRY W. HOLMES.

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INAUGURATING THE PLAN

By Henry R. Linville
President of the Teachers Union of New York

PURSUANT to a suggestion offered at a meeting of the Executive Board of the Teachers Union of New York City in February 1929, the president of the organization was authorized to take the initiative in ascertaining what public interest there might be in a proposal to celebrate the approaching seventieth birthday anniversary of Professor John Dewey. Through somewhat extended correspondence it was found that the idea appealed to many persons in widely different fields of activity.

On April 19, 1929, a luncheon conference was held at the Town Hall Club, New York City, which was attended by twenty-three persons representing not only academic groups, but also civic, labor, and social-welfare groups. It was decided at this conference to approve the enterprise of holding a birthday celebration as a personal tribute to Professor Dewey as well as for the public recognition of his contributions to thought in the fields of education, philosophy, and general social progress.

An organizing committee was selected with authority to add to its number and to form the "Na-

tional Committee to Honor John Dewey", which in turn would formally sponsor the celebration. The organizing committee was transformed into an Executive Committee. This committee elected as its Chairman, Professor William H. Kilpatrick, of Teachers College, Columbia University, and as Secretary, Dr. Henry R. Linville, President of the Teachers Union of New York.

The Executive Committee agreed that the occasion would require an extended program of more than one session. It decided that an institute of three sessions would afford the proper setting for the celebration, and planned to have the first session devoted to an exposition of Professor Dewey's contributions to education, and the second session to his contributions to philosophy. The third session, the Executive Committee decided, should be a luncheon and the occasion be combined with the discussion of Professor Dewey's contributions to general social welfare.

The celebration was carried out in accordance with this plan. On Friday evening, October 18, 1929, and Saturday morning, October 19, the first and second sessions were held before large audiences in the auditorium of the Horace Mann School, New York City. The luncheon session was held on Saturday, October 19, in the Hotel Astor and was attended by twenty-three hundred persons.

INTRODUCTION

By William H. Kilpatrick
Professor of Education
Teachers College, Columbia University

THE writings in this book are meant to tell of the indebtedness which we, with many in this country and throughout the world, feel to Professor Dewey. They were offered as a kind of homage to him on his seventieth birthday, in behalf of the thousands who came together at that time in New York to greet him and of the more who would but could not come. We are indeed indebted to him. He has helped us to see more broadly and deeper down and, we believe, more truly than without him had been our lot to see. For these things we are deeply grateful.

Not only has Professor Dewey helped us who feel it so, but we believe that he has helped a much larger number than know it. Every school child in our country is probably witness of the fact. And still further, some of us believe — feel compelled to believe, in spite of the danger of mistake when any age would evaluate itself — that the world has in and through John Dewey taken great steps forward in its thinking, steps which it will never withdraw and for which his name will stand clearer as time shall run.

It is, of course, easy in such things to follow the heart and claim much where much is felt. This foreword, too, is no place for setting out the grounds for such a claim, nor is this writer the one to do it. But a few words to show somewhat of the inner fullness of the claim may not be out of place.

Possibly Professor Dewey has most helped us by showing how in scientific method may be found a way of philosophizing which puts common sense, science, and philosophy, all three, in continuous relation. They may differ in their work, but all three are of one close family. Philosophy need no longer hold itself aloof from life, nor speak in outlandish tongues, nor, denying its kin, count all else to lie outside its pale of kind. Not in mere word but in very fact does Dewey's philosophy live among men. It knows their thoughts, speaks their words, and feels the good and the evil of their lives much as they feel it. Denying none of these, it still shows us how to make them better than they otherwise would be. Beginning with man's life in and of itself, however and wherever it may be found, he gets from it the ways and means of making life better to live here and now and still better henceforth. Thus from life itself he gets his stuff to begin with, and the ways of working it up into something ever better. Thus comes his logic, a revolution in itself; in like manner his psychology, so knit and fashioned in and with

his logic that none can disentangle the two. So has his method worked. Beginning in this way with life it was easy for him — and easy for us now that he has shown us — to get from biology a bent or turn that runs through all and makes all quick with life itself, so that each part lends itself as does no other point of view to every effort to make life better.

No side or part of life lies then untouched by his mind. If education seems most to show it, it is partly because education, as he has taught us, is one with the very going on of life itself. And how this view has remade our schools! Much, very much, is yet to be done; and some things newly offered by others will not stand the test. But after all is said, school life everywhere in our country and in many distant parts is finer and sweeter and more fruitful because of what he has taught. And the body of thought and practice still moves, even if slowly, more and more toward his teachings. A like effect the world has seldom if ever seen within the lifetime of the man himself.

We cannot here follow up Dewey's influence, great though it is, in other lines — ethics, politics, law, social outlook, labor, religion. In this region where man most lives and ideals should most serve, fixity had entrenched itself, pretendedly of necessity, actually of will. This fixity had been found to

serve those who have. For them existing arrangements must stay, ideals must not grow. But against this, modern science and industry have come, and the old order is upset. In new and now obvious ways fixed thought becomes bound thought, shackling to life. Ideals must move. Democracy must extend itself into all human relations. Affairs then must be plastic to thought. Here Dewey serves. His attack on a metaphysic of fixed ideals and the separation of thought and action points a way out, and he becomes the prophet of a better order.

It is such thoughts as these that have been in the minds of his friends as they planned the birthday party to let Professor Dewey and the world know somewhat of how they feel toward him. And in this those at hand but acted for the larger number who could not come. Constructive thinker, we hail him, and critic of dogma and interests. If any fear, we say with Emerson, "Beware when the great God lets lose a thinker on this planet."

JOHN DEWEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO EDUCATIONAL THEORY

By Ernest C. Moore
Director of the University of California at Los Angeles

YOU, Sir, whom we know, love and most highly value, and you, Mr. Commissioner, and you, Ladies and Gentlemen, friends all of you of Professor Dewey:

I cannot begin without acknowledging how great a trust and how valued a privilege your Committee has given me, inadequate as I am. Not once only in human history has the relation of master and student been a sacred relation, as scores of us are here to testify. We think of Professor Dewey as the most profound and understanding thinker on education that the world has yet known.

Any one who is given to walking about in the United States and looking into schoolroom windows has seen sights recently quite different from those his mother and his father saw. He has seen classrooms equipped like workshops with little children not sitting still all day at desks but going about the room freely at their group undertakings. They are constructing things, or experimenting to find out things, or conversing with their fellows and assisting them. The teacher is not hearing recitations. She

seldom does that; she is passing freely among them, encouraging them in their undertakings. There is no problem of discipline, for every one is at work. This school looks more like a home with many happy children playing together than like a schoolroom of the old sort under a taskmaster's eye. It has the spirit of a home.

Remember that there is perhaps no field where changes are harder to bring about than in teaching practice. It is nearly as unchanging as Parmenides' Universe of Being. Some one must have found a fulcrum for his lever.

Plato has it in one place that a man ought to pay for his nurture to the society which reared him, and that the best form which that payment can take is for him to do something for the education of those who come after him. Some of us believe that no man has ever paid his τροφεῖα as generously as Professor Dewey has.

Yet, though this is a glad occasion, a time of rejoicing and deep congratulation, it must be said that the thing which we are doing tonight is a most dangerous thing. Every philosophy has suffered at the hands of its interpreters. Pythagoras was not a Pythagorean, Socrates not a Socratic, and there are those who contend that Christ was not a Christian. Is this philosophy to be the one exception? It is a beneficent arrangement that insures that if we go

wrong we shall be set right by the master who put our feet in this way.

The most puzzling problem that I have lighted on in this investigation is why have so few philosophers been philosophers of education? I can think of but five who have been. Their names are impressive. Socrates, Plato, John Locke, Johann Freidrich Herbart, and John Dewey. The others we shall say were either not philosophers or not educators. About Socrates, the father of all philosophy, there can be no doubt. He was the examiner of life and was perpetually engaged upon human and political virtue.

The Republic of Plato may well claim to be regarded as the first of secular books. In it the most daring of reformers asks what changes must be made in human attitudes and arrangements before the life of man can become most rich and full. The answer, he says, is written in small letters in the life of each individual and in large letters in the life of the organized state. The story which the letters tell is the same in both places. It is the story of how the citizen-soul must be solicited to grow from birth until it departs to the Islands of the Blessed. Every institution of man's life is brought to bar and weighed and measured in the light of its effectiveness in serving that one end. Never was so pragmatic a book as this one, never was such a drastic

renovation undertaken as Plato there undertakes in the name of education. Shall we let Homer tell the children what he fancies about the gods; or what must we tell them about gods and men if they are to grow up to buy freedom even with the price of death? He is the divine Plato whose thoughts are worthy of God, but those thoughts about God were contributed in the name of the children as teaching material. No wonder Rousseau called this the greatest book on education ever written. It was that until John Dewey wrote his *Democracy and Education.*

How did it come about that western philosophy, which was above everything philosophy of education to its great founders, Socrates and Plato, should concern itself after them hardly at all with their chief interest? It may be because Aristotle's discussion of education breaks off in the middle of the 8th book of the *Politics* and but a fragment of it has come down to us. The trouble with that conjecture is that Aristotle's discussions of other matters are not educational discussions, as those of Socrates and Plato were. Aristotle drew the map of intellectual objectives for the world. He contributed the program which thinkers of all sorts followed until the Renaissance and which philosophers with considerable unanimity have continued to follow in spite of the Renaissance. He was the great

classifier. Knowledge, he said, is of two kinds, theoretical and practical, and he alone of all the followers of Socrates makes this sharp distinction. Theoretical knowledge is the contemplation of truth, contemplation unmixed with volition. God is perpetually engaged in such contemplation. Whoever would be godlike must, like him, engage himself in the contemplation of that which cannot be other than it is.

It is said that every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian; either a liberal or a conservative, Mr. Gilbert phrases it; the thought is the same. Every one of us is born either to hunger and thirst after righteousness or to take satisfaction in counting what is already in the bag, in gloating over it, naming, arranging and classifying it, and in playing games of dogmatic defense of its static completeness. As between these two wings of tendency John Dewey is a Platonist rather than an Aristotelian. For this rather daring judgment I am glad to have the confirmation of Professor Whitehead given me without prompting in conversation yesterday. He is as much interested in souls as Plato is and quite a little more confident that they are not of different kinds. He is as much interested in knowledge as the sole means of man's salvation as either Socrates or Plato is. He is as much concerned as Plato in using the best we know as a raft on which to go

forward, though he is not at all convinced that the best is the unchanging, but Plato would most likely have talked of the uniformity of nature if he had lived in this day. There is the greatest similarity between these two thinkers in the value they attach to education and the thoroughness with which they serve its claims.

Philosophy since Plato has treated the struggling life of man with little consideration. It has said: "It is an appearance only, let us think on the unchanging and eternal." It has taken refuge in a dualism so anti-human that it cannot carry out the commandment of God to Socrates and has slight concern for it.

I recall a morning walk with Professor William James in Berkeley but a day or two before he gave that famous address which introduced pragmatism officially to the world. He was fresh from theological battle with Professor Howison and was repeating its thrust and parry with his well remembered avidity. "But," said I, mightily impressed by two years' sitting in Professor Dewey's classroom, "Professor Dewey does not often refer to God. He has no such familiar acquaintance with Him as you theological philosophers have." "If he does not mention God he is no philosopher," said Professor James. Perhaps he was wrong. Is it the most abstract of the ones by which the many is organized that demands

the maximum of attention? Does the first commandment wholly set aside the second? May not this be a point of departure, the promiseful beginning of a new era? The more one is absorbed in the contemplation of the ineffable Brahm the less interest can he have in Brahm's creatures. Theosophy annihilates. The Hindu has no concern for social welfare. He cultivates what he is pleased to call the spiritual life, to the accompaniment of, if not by means of thrasonical disdain for his fellowman.

There is a kind of religion which is opium to those who believe it. It does not say with Edward Everett Hale, "I believe in the divinity of man just as Christ did." And there is a kind of philosophy whose object is the paralysis of the human will. Philosophers of that description have been content from time to time to throw teachers and parents some scraps of their attention, but for the most part these scraps have been so unnutritious as to be manifest evidences of mechanical charity rather than of solicitous regard. The classical philosophy's view of education is that it is a beholding of the universe. Nothing infuriates an orthodox fundamentalist of that school more than to suggest that studies are each of them human instruments devised and taught to enable the young little by little to do the work of the world and by a greater mastery of these human tools to do it better than their fathers did it. He rages

against all forms of vocational education and all ideas that seem to partake of it. With a fine disregard for history he declares that liberal education is pure vision. To all innovations which affect his calling and particularly to that most abhorrent of them all — the study of education — he applies the objection which Edward Caird's professor made to all proposals for the increase of scientific teaching in the college, — "It is not consistent with the idea of a university as it exists in the Divine mind."

Can intellectualism have a real interest in education? Its process is too confused, its objective too indeterminate, its account of mind too passive, and of man too indifferent. But when the conviction that man is a shaper of the world, not a beholder merely, takes firm hold of any one, it speedily drives him to that place in the universe where shaping is the order of existence. It makes him more concerned with the supreme art of shaping human powers and fitting them for social activity than with anything else.

This philosophy of education begins, then, with a conviction concerning knowledge. That conviction derives from Francis, Lord Bacon, who sounded a new battle cry in the warfare which humans wage against ignorance. "Knowledge," he said, "is power." What he meant is very simple. Heat applied to a boiler filled with water generates steam.

Water falling from a height upon the flanges of a water wheel forces the wheel to revolve. Gas ignited by an electric spark in an explosion chamber furnishes power. When Bacon said "Knowledge is power" he meant that its function is to perform work. But he did not always say that. As a convert he lapsed, he backslid from his own gospel, for he sometimes said things very different from that and quite inconsistent with it. For example, I find him saying: "God hath shaped the mind of man like a glass capable of the image of the universal world . . . for knowledge is a double of that which is." That God has not shaped the mind of man like a looking glass or a camera will I think be sufficiently clear from a single illustration. Suppose the end of the room to be a blackboard. Let us cover it with Arabic numerals. Will you be good enough to look at them now that they have been written? How many of them can you see clearly at any one moment? Not many, and always one figure clearer than all the rest. That is, our seeing is focalized seeing. Our minds work by fixation, by attention. There is always a center to every field of consciousness. Not so with the mirror or the camera. They reflect all that is before them impartially. Human knowledge then must be the product of organic selection and rejection.

But there is a further distinction which is impor-

tant. There are two kinds of knowledge of football. The kind which the folks who sit on the bleachers have — bleacher knowledge — the knowledge of spectators or lookers on, and the kind which the players have — player's knowledge. The two kinds are not interchangeable. If you take spectators from the bleachers and put them into the field and order them to play, they cannot. They do not know what to do next, then after that, and after that. Their training as observers does not qualify them as resourceful doers.

It is plain that while the world will get along very well if only a few of us become doers of football it will not get along well if we maintain the spectator attitude in the game of life. Structurally we are not built to be beholders here. The sensory nerves and the motor nerves run into each other. They report to each other; they condition each other; the nervous system is one. Knowing cannot be a self-sufficient whole to a being whose organs of knowing are built into its organs of doing and whose organs of doing are harnessed up to its organs of knowing. Our nervous system is essentially a unitary arrangement for converting stimuli into appropriate activity and activity into stimuli for further activity. Anatomy and physiology are not alone in that pronouncement. The whole import of biological evolution supports it. Organisms grow in complexity

by means of an increasing ability to adjust themselves to an ever enlarging space and time environment. They advance by participating in the activities of the world, by making them contribute to their organic well-being — in short, by using them. Growth in intelligence is but another name for this growth in organic control. Can intellectualism be the creed of any thinker who has pondered the lesson of evolution? He can no more believe that knowledge is a spectator beholding, a double of that which is, than he can believe in the special creation of unchanging organic forms.

There is one further constraint that will not let us go until we disavow the ancient double theory of knowledge which has made such a mess of man's comprehension or his relation to his world. Seeing ratifies and confirms believing; and only the believing which can get itself confirmed in seeing or hearing or touching or tasting or smelling can be true. How can it get itself confirmed save by arranging cunningly devised experiments to put its anticipations to the test of sight and sound and touch? If our anticipations cannot be confirmed experimentally, if they obstinately insist upon being different from what comes out when we put them to the careful laboratory test, then there is nothing for it but that such beliefs or anticipations are unmistakably wrong. The test of action runs against

them and finds them wanting. But belief, anticipation, judgment, prepare the way for testing. They are not certainty themselves but its unmistakable forerunners. Guessing, dialectic, deduction, may be the fertile mothers of truth, but truth will come to birth only in extemporized or natural *de facto* verification. In our generation the laboratory has become the court of last appeal. Literature, religion, abstract logic, and prophetic intuition may clamor for attention as loudly as they dare, man has at last found a way of putting their pronouncements to an action test and finding by outcome whether or not they can be relied upon.

When knowledge under criticism proves to be so different a thing in reality from what uncritical tradition has reported it to be, is it not inevitable that knowledge in the truer sense should begin to be sought everywhere in schools? It is not the double of that which is — any more than the hand is the double of what it takes hold of; it is not a visual, verbal, or auditory image made in the likeness of the existents which stand around us; it is not in any form of verbalism, whether of logical definitions or classifications or realistic or impressionistic descriptions. Above all, it has to do chiefly, not with the past and what has happened thus far, but with the future and what can be made to grow in it. In short, knowledge is activity selecting

purposes, employing the resources of experience and not repeating its achievements of the day before, but out of its acquirements of the past creating new acquirements to meet the demands of the new moment, the new hour, the new day, which calls forth its functioning. Knowledge that is is action, is power performing its appropriate work. The engineer has it, the physician has it, the research student has it. It would be better to say of each of them, not that he has it, but that he is it, for if you ask him to verbalize what he knows he cannot do it, he cannot objectify it as a list of possessions, it has no completeness in itself and cannot be counted, inventoried, or contemplated aesthetically. But give the engineer a bridge or a dam to construct, the physician a patient to heal, the research student an investigation to make and he knows where to take hold and how to proceed to get results. Their knowledge is an action system, an attitude, a disposition to marshal past experiences to new needs; and they know how.

Normally healthy minds begin putting two and two together at birth. They are not blank sheets of paper upon which the senses write; instead they are musculatured needs which start their search for supplies during the first hour of existence. Some of these needs are fairly definite; most are vague. Together they precipitate a great activity which

perpetually seeks to articulate with the environment, tending to repeat itself when it does that and to try, try again when it fails. The young child is built for experimenting from birth. He is charged with activity, yet ushered into the world so helpless that survival is impossible for him unless he serves a long apprenticeship to the fostering care that substitutes for him at first in making the necessary reactions in the game which nature plays with each of us to see whether we can endure. It is not enough that he survive physically. He must as rapidly as may be become his own battler for survival, his own survival and that of others. To do that he must learn to care for the things which his group cares for and do the things which it does — and if possible to do them better than it does; that is, his activity must come to run in the group form. It is just as necessary that his elders should teach him what to do with his brain and muscles, arms and legs as it is that they should give him a biological equipment of brain and muscles, arms and legs. The nearly complete helplessness of the young, though the most familiar of experiences, is the least observed of facts. We are born languageless, not knowing our right hand from our left, poison from food, or danger from safety. All the distinctions of things and qualities, together with the names we give them and the uses to which we put them, must be worked

out after we get here. "All that is human is learned," says Professor Dewey.

Here then are the factors which must be integrated: a new impulsive being highly charged with indeterminate activity, built to be a learner throughout life, though a slow one, and even then only on condition that the preferences of its own nature are allowed to function in that learning; on the other hand, the human species which has been here a long time and through trial and error slightly mixed with conscious intention, has discovered preferred forms of human activity which it commends to its children and which it would engage them to employ. How shall we integrate the equation? Professor Dewey reminds us, and I think this is the key sentence in his educational philosophy, that "Only that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge."

Man works intelligently by setting purposes before himself and striving to attain them, by unearthing problems and struggling forward to their solution. It is his objectification of his purposes and his systematic assembling of resources with which to reach them that makes human action different from brute action, human learning different from merely animal learning. The advice to college

students to strive to make high-powered rifles of their minds rather than waste baskets epitomizes the doctrine. But how shall that be done unless they have been trained to find the target from the first? The ability to carry on research, we are told, is the finest fruit of the training process. If so, at what stage should training in searching begin? Distinguishing facts from conjectures and mere conversation about them, valuing evidence and learning how to find it, putting the proper price tags on things and actions, and withal becoming conscious and steadfast servants of truth and honesty are or should be the day by day activities of education. But at what point should they begin to characterize the course? Our answer is that all the things that belong to it must characterize education from the first: Constructive activity, searching, handling evidence, putting matters to the proof, helping and being helped, coöperating, making up one's own mind, doing one's part — all must have their place in the first school if they are to have their place in the last school and in the life which follows it. The dictum that the school is life, not a preparation for life, becomes altogether clear and self-evident, I think, if we substitute the word health for life. The school must be health now and all the time to be a preparation for health hereafter.

We are born languageless but — and here I should

like to avail myself of a quotation — "The process of acquiring language is a practically perfect model of proper educative growth, the start is from native activities of the vocal apparatus, organs of hearing, etc. . . . The native activities develop through the uses to which they are put. The office of the social medium . . . is to direct growth through putting powers to the best possible use. . . . The natural or native powers furnish the initiating and limiting forces in all education; they do not furnish its ends or aims. There is no learning except from a beginning in unlearned powers . . . but the moral is not to leave them alone to follow their own spontaneous development but to provide an environment which shall organize them."

There was a time when the young learned everything just as they learned to use the common language. They associated with their elders and helped them in the work of the household. They had an informal apprenticeship to the arts of life. They mastered the elements of its first concerns, the getting of food, clothing, and shelter, with as little awareness that they were learning anything indispensable as attended their learning of the home language. They worked with things, had duties, did their part. Then came the industrial revolution and took the basic operations of life out of the home and shut them up out of sight behind the walls

of the factory. Schools had been necessary for a long time to teach the difficult arts of reading, writing, and arithmetic — which could not well be learned in the leisureless home. But that was only a part of one's learning, an outgrowth and supplement of what one learned at home, and was based on and understood by means of it. When the industries moved away from the home they took away the child's contacts with nature, his firsthand familiarity with things, his life-giving coöperation with his elders in necessary and meaningful work, and most of his opportunity for purposeful and constructive activity. Informal learning largely fell away, but formal learning went on as before, as though it still could live when its roots were gone. Hence the need for a new type of school.

The start is from native activities, just as it is in the child's learning of the mother tongue. Like all young animals children engage in play-work almost from their birth. Such play is nature's training school for the young of each species, since in it they rehearse the activities they will afterward perform as their business in life. Very young children test the qualities of things by putting them into their mouths and by tearing them to pieces, seemingly in order to put them in their mouths. They are born to handle and explore, to work with tools as their elders do, to make and build, and of a con-

sequence to purpose, plan, assemble means, and with joy and lively interest to carry out their undertakings. It was one of the first philosophers of education who noted this natural tendency in children and advised that it should be made the vehicle of all instruction. "Let their learning," he said, "be a play to them, for no compelled discipline is lasting in the soul." There are those who object to play schools. Usually such too unhesitating thinkers have never tried to distinguish work from play in a definition, and most of them would perhaps be ready to admit that it is only on those days at the end of which one can say "My work was play for me today" that one works best. Let us concede them the name. Let us talk about activity schools and activity education.

Activities mean a lot to adults. It is only when we undertake or project something, be it the preparation of a speech, the writing of an article or a book, the preparation of a case to be tried in court, the ordering of a dinner, the arranging of a party, the growing of a crop, the building of a house, the winning of a game, that the learning process becomes an acutely active process with us. Some one has said God is best worshipped only where man is a creator. Be that as it may, it is clear that the life of man takes on significance and depth and power only in those times and places in which he is caught up

in great undertakings and finds his soul invited to great enterprises. It is not otherwise with children. They are born just as we are to explore, to find out, to construct, to share in our undertakings, to achieve. When these, their native tendencies, are allowed to function in the school program they work wholeheartedly, they accomplish results and they coöperate with their fellows in making plans and in carrying them out, they handle materials and learn about their qualities and values and the rudiments of the techniques of working them into humanly serviceable forms. It is not because an activity school is more joyous than a lesson learning school and that all who have a part in it are interested in what they are doing; it is because activity is the only means to effective learning that we value it. Remember that intellectual work is the conceiving of purposes, the projecting of ends, the determining of objectives, and the assembling or unearthing or gathering of means with which to accomplish them. Unless the learner is trained to determine his own undertakings, to conceive his own problems, to set up his own objectives, he is not being trained to work intelligently at all. Activities which are dictated or prescribed, activities in which the learner is told exactly what to do make him but a hand moved and directed by another person's brain, not using his own thoughtfulness and

self-direction at all. There is no education in that, for education is learning to employ one's own intelligence in foreseeing ends and finding out how to reach them. The activity school trains its children to choose their own purposes, to fix upon their own objectives and then to search for the means of accomplishing them, and to do these things coöperatively, that is, with and by the help of their fellows. They learn by doing. Their constructive work gives them a firsthand knowledge of things as materials and the beginnings of human operations with them, and since their undertakings are group undertakings, they typify social situations. Activities which require the perception and elaboration of ends and necessitate the use of judgment in selecting and adapting means to reach them and allow opportunity for the making of mistakes, are the ones to be chosen. We want crude materials out of which finished materials will come only with deliberation, situations which make the learner conscious of the problems involved before the solutions are reached, such a using of things as will reveal their properties and lead to skill in the handling of them, not work with formed materials or lessons which merely describe objects without allowing the pupil to find out what they are by using them, or mere exercises. Let the child begin then as the race began with the useful social occupations. Let him grow

up to an interest in science by making his way through its groundwork. It will not then be meaningless and abstract and, above all, it will not be inert. The knowledge which came first to the race and must come first to each of its children is knowledge of how to do. The primary subject matter upon which the understanding of its advanced stages altogether depends always exists as matter for doing, handling, working with, constructing according to the learner's need or purpose; otherwise it does not belong to his life. It is just something put upon him to be memorized and reproduced when he is asked for it.

Such groundwork of doing as we have been describing is doing in partnership with others. They assist in making the plans, they share in the enterprise, they make suggestions. They tell us what we did not know and needed to know. The information which they give us has value. It is pertinent to our need. Whatsoever information is of that kind, that is, whatever answers our questions and responds to our felt need, works into our experience and becomes ours. The rest is words, empty, meaningless and harmful, for it deceives us into believing that we have knowledge when we have it not.

With this core of direct experience of things through operations with them as a background of

realization, communication of information through language becomes an available means of indirect experience. By what we have ourselves experienced we can interpret what others tell us they have experienced, and thus enlarge the meanings of our own world. The business of information then is to enrich and free the personal contacts of life by supplying their background and deepening their significance. The theme of all studies is the life of men. They tell of human operations with nature and with our fellows. They tell us about these operations that we may do them or shun them or use our awareness of them as a frame of understanding to enclose and direct our own operations with nature and our fellowman. The studies most humanly helpful for these purposes are history, science, and art — history to go along with geography, and science to begin with nature study. History and geography supply the outline account of men upon and in relation to the earth and to each other. In that account the earth is not a stage with scenery upon which the human drama is worked out. It is a condition, a cause of what takes place. But not the whole cause, for its energies are harnessed and mastered with varying degrees of success. And man's relations to his fellows are not relations of collocation merely, not determining relations only, but determined — determined by him. If this

story is to be a dynamic story that comes home, it must begin at home and extend the home facts and the home relations. Its reasons for being told is its bearing upon today and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. It must never be merely a tale which is told.

Science is the name for that persistent and methodical endeavor by which the human race has learned to attain reliability in its experiences. It is a method of going to work to find out what we must know, not a reading and a memorizing of what others have found out by working scientifically. The essence of the teaching of science must be such familiarity and love for its method of going to work to find the facts in situations that concern us that that method will be employed as long as one lives. Scientific method is the instrument of progress, the chief intellectual tool of the race. Its significance can be learned only by use. Without appreciation of its value one cannot be said to have been converted to the conviction that human intelligence has power to direct human affairs.

Art is creation, but creation has been going on all along in the play-work we have been describing. Art is imagination, and imagining is as real a part of human activity as is seeing with the eyes or grasping with the hand. Both play and purposive work call for a seeing of that which is not yet visible — a sensing

or appreciation of meanings. Without that adumbration of expectancy activity is mechanical. Makings are all one at first. The distinction of fine and coarse, or merely useful, comes later. It is a difference of degree, not of kind. The makings which are outgrowths of an intensified prizing evoke a peculiar enjoyment. They fix taste, they standardize achievement, they arouse in the beholder an illumination of perception which reveals the uncommonness of what but for them had been commonplace. "To feel the meaning of what one is doing and to rejoice in that meaning, to unite in one concurrent fact the unfolding of the inner emotional life and the ordered development of material external conditions — that is art. Art is industry unusually conscious of its own meaning — adequately conscious, emotionally and intellectually." Art is a mean between the industry which is merely mechanical and a dallying search for beauty which is merely sentimental and effusive. The beginnings of its culture lie in making the play of children productive of results.

In this conception of education everything depends upon the right start — everything except carrying on what is started. Every school must be an activity school. Appreciation must come before technique and the testing of results in every field of endeavor. The student must be introduced to

each study by himself handling simple representative problems and facts in its field to give him a "feel" of its significance. If he is launched with a comprehension of the meaning of his undertaking the ideas generated within him will be possessed ideas, moving ideas, not absorbed or truncated learning, not other men's ideas, but ideas that are so much his own that he will not get away from them. They will inevitably flower in his character.

The aim of education is just the making of this process of purposive working with one's world a life process. Intelligence is activity, a verb not a noun. The test of its presence is not a having but a doing. It is a discerning of relationships and the using of continuities in the anticipation of outcomes. Education is but the assisting of that activity through such a remaking of experience as reveals its meaning and thereby increases ability to direct the course of oncoming experience. It succeeds when it assists folks to work by aims — aims which are not given them from the outset and the outside, but aims which they thoughtfully extract from the conditions which surround them and which they employ to order those conditions, realizing their aims when they can be realized and revising and renewing them when they fail to help to the mastery of what must be mastered. The educative process is all one with the moral process, since the objective of both is to

bring it to pass that the good man shall not merely repeat his goodness of the day before and the hour before and so become a bad man, for the hour before and the day before are gone and our sole duty is to grow in knowledge and in grace to meet the new demands of the new hour and the new day which is upon us. The only proof that a school is a good school is that its pupils go on eagerly and consciously learning until they die. The good training makes perpetual learners of them.

Contrast this with cultural education whose outcome too frequently is to make us feel superior to our fellows through the possession of an observer's knowledge which they do not possess, though we have not been trained to do anything with it save contemplate our own superiority. Contrast it with vocational education, which has the great advantage of being a training in and for activity, but proceeds within so narrow a framework of meanings as not to enable its students to attain a comprehension of the service which they render or to become resourceful in planning their objectives or constantly to gather experience to remake their service. Contrast it with moral education in which the *ipse dixit* of some master for all time sets the goal and nothing remains for the growing spirit but to accept its purposes upon that master's say-so and merely practise the means to attain them; contrast it with the educa-

tion of the religious teacher who begins by making the supreme denial by saying that creation is over and it remains for man to concern himself only with its souvenirs; contrast it with education for citizenship in a state not forever being made by the desire of its citizens, by their wanting it to be, but made by its founders in the past and only read about and talked about now. Contrast it, in short, with any and every education which is a preparation for life, a process of outreaching and enlarging one's resources, which stops when school-going stops, and then ask which of these activities ministers to the spirit the more wholesomely, the one which puts it into conscious possession of its powers and makes it aware that its business is the remaking of its world, or the one which makes it feel that the world has been made before it came and all it should do is to hear about it and accept it.

There, is, in truth, a great difference here. What is at stake is nothing other than the proper conduct of the souls of men. The issues are the good life or the bad life. The story is still to be written in small letters and in large letters. For the outcome we put our trust in two things which in their present promise are new to the world, democracy and science. Not in democracy as fulfillment, but in democracy as process, not in science as a body of results, but in science as the way of finding out. We think

of Plato as forever right when he said each one is fitted by nature for some work, and he is happy and his state is well organized when he is doing his work and only then. But we think Plato was forever wrong when he said there are only three kinds of work to be done in the state and three kinds of natures to do them. He would have had a caste system — or at least something very like it. Democracy is the discovery that original capacities are as various as the individuals whose they are and as indispensable to the state. The democratic state on which our hope is fixed is the state which will cherish and use the capacities of its members. Of that better state our present organization of existence is the promise. It will learn to use its resources in folks as it has learned to use its resources in things; that is, it will learn to use its resources spiritual as it has learned to use its resources material. The proof that it will is that it has found the process by which intelligence works to order its world — the process which is scientific method. Not always will men trust to luck, or Providence, or destiny as their forbears, the astrologers, trusted the stars to bring good fortune to them. They will learn to pray as Hesoid said the farmers should, with their hands upon their plow. The plow which they will use is a fact-finding and fact-comprehending intelligence.

It is those who are responsible for the upbringing

of the young who are commissioned especially to serve democracy by enlarging the operation of science. They must come to know and employ the educative process. They must give the native capacities and interests of children a chance working in the spirit of play and along with their fellows and through the searching and assembling necessary to attain constructive ends to train themselves to work by objectives and to objectives which is the sole form of intellectual efficiency.

"A reorganization of education so that learning takes place in connection with the intelligent carrying forward of purposeful activities is a slow work. It can only be accomplished piecemeal, a step at a time" writes Professor Dewey. The image which has forced itself upon my mind as day by day I have reread the writings of this protagonist of a life worthy to be lived by every man, is of nothing so much as of another Atlas struggling to lift a world. He will lift it.

JOHN DEWEY'S INFLUENCE IN THE SCHOOLS

By Jesse H. Newlon

Professor of Education and Director of Lincoln School of Teachers College, Columbia University

IN his earlier educational writings, Professor Dewey with characteristic modesty spoke as though he were interpreting a movement already under way. In 1899 he said in *The School and Society:* "Now the change which is coming into our education is the shifting of the center of gravity. It is a change, a revolution, not unlike that introduced by Copernicus when the astronomical center shifted from the earth to the sun. In this case the child becomes the sun about which the appliances of education revolve; he is the center about which they are organized."

Looking back from the vantage point of thirty years, these seem indeed prophetic words. Truly a revolution has been under way. What has been the character of this revolution, and how has it been influenced by the thought of John Dewey?

As a background for considering these changes, four principles claim our attention:

I. Dewey focused the attention of teachers on the nature and the needs of the child. He makes

child growth rather than the demands of subject-matter the center of the school's activities, a distinction of the utmost importance. This tendency had its beginnings in the eighteenth century or earlier. The Herbartians, too, had sensed the value of interest, and had advocated a school imbued with the love of childhood; but their extreme emphasis on the social heritage and on method, the formalism of the five steps, made for a rigid system with knowledge and the teacher in the leading rôles. In important respects the new movement in education was already under way. In actual practice, subject-matter, the things to be learned, memorized, still occupied the center of the stage. To regard subject-matter and activities primarily as means rather than as ends in themselves, to make rich living and child development the central fact of the school, is a radical departure. Except in those institutions that have not seen fit to change their practices in a generation, the pupils in American schools are much freer, more natural, happier, living a life much more significant to them, than when *The School and Society* was written. Through his earlier writings and his experimental school, Dewey clarified the educational situation by revealing child growth in a social institution as the function of the school. The development of the new school dates from these events.

II. The second principle is that education is the process of experiencing. This point of view was tersely expressed in *The Child and The Curriculum* (1902): "Moreover, subject-matter never can be got into the child from without. Learning is active. It involves organic assimilation starting from within."

And again, in *Democracy and Education*: "Education may be defined as a process of the continuous reconstruction of experience, with the purpose of widening and deepening its social content, while at the same time the individual gains control of the methods involved."

If education is a process of experiencing, if we learn by doing, then things must be arranged in the school so that the child may learn through experience. The work of the school must be judged by the growth of the pupil in power to meet new situations and in variety of interests, rather than by the particular factual knowledge which he may be able to recall.

Thinking is the prime factor in one's ability to cope with new situations; to bring the meanings of past experience to bear in the interpretation of new situations, in the solution of new problems. ". . . there is not adequate theoretical recognition that all the school can or need do for pupils so far as their minds are concerned . . . is to develop their ability to think."

But how does one learn to think, and what is the function of thinking in the educative process? From every conceivable angle, and repeatedly, this question is discussed by Dewey. There is no mistaking the point of view. The function of thinking is the management of experience. There can be no thinking except in the face of a problem. "Thinking," he writes, "begins in what may fairly be termed a forked-road situation, a situation which is ambiguous, which presents a dilemma, which proposes alternatives. . . ."

And again: "Demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of reflection."

It is apparent, then, that merely learning and reciting lessons fails almost completely to provide for growth in reflective thinking. This comes only from coping with genuine problems that challenge the powers of the pupil. The school must provide these problems the solution of which the pupil's nature "imperiously demands." An understanding of this theory of learning is essential to an evaluation of recent educational developments in this country.

III. The third principle is found in his doctrine of interest and effort, which has had a marked effect on practice and is a corollary to the theory of education as experiencing. "Interest" is a word

that has long been associated in the popular mind with the name of Dewey. Some apparently do not yet comprehend the fact that his theory of interest *includes* a theory of effort. In *Interest and Effort,* p. 7, this position is clearly stated: "The common assumption is that of the externality of the object, idea, or end to be mastered to the self. Because the object or end is assumed to be outside self it has to be *made* interesting; to be surrounded with artificial stimuli and with fictitious inducements to attention. Or, because the object lies outside the sphere of self, the sheer power of "will," the putting forth of effort without interest, has to be appealed to. The genuine principle of interest is the principle of the recognized identity of the fact to be learned or the action proposed with the growing self; that it lies in the direction of the agent's own growth, and is, therefore, imperiously demanded, if the agent is to be himself. Let this condition of identification once be secured, and we have neither to appeal to sheer strength of will, nor to occupy ourselves with making things interesting."

Dr. Frank McMurry, who shared in the discussions of the brilliant educational thinkers of the nineties, writes me concerning the effect of Dewey's *Interest and Effort* when it first appeared. "Many of the graybeards could not see it. They thought there was quibbling. Others, however, were

aroused in opposition because they thought this interest doctrine was yielding altogether too much to the child's whims. Colonel Parker was wonderfully attracted to interest. He realized that a great step was being taken towards making the child a center instead of subordinating the child to subject matter. The fact that we are only starting *even now* on the idea of interest suggests how big the idea is and how difficult to practise. There was no problem in the curriculum to speak of until the doctrine of interest emphasized the need of selecting subject matter that would appeal to the child. The way this idea has percolated through the teaching body until it has here and there reached a college professor is interesting."

The key to the problem is to be found in "the recognized identity of the fact to be learned, or the action proposed, with the growing self." If this view is accepted, the curriculum cannot be something external to the learner; it is a dismal failure unless he identifies himself with it. The task of making such a curriculum is indeed the most complicated and difficult one in the entire field of education.

IV. Finally, Dewey has stated a new theory of the school. He regards the school as a social institution, "inherently a part of the total social process." The school is a community whose processes are social

processes, not different from the social processes that go on outside the school. In 1899 he spoke of the school as ". . . an embryonic community life, active with types of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society and permeated throughout with the spirit of art, history, and science. When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious." The implications of this concept are far reaching.

The school not only shares in the process of placing youth in possession of the social heritage, but through appropriate method seeks to develop their creative powers. The mere linking together of the words "school and society" has exerted a marked influence on the thinking not only of teachers but of laymen, and this influence has synchronized with other forces in American life that have tended to emphasize the importance of the school. It should also be pointed out that Dewey accepts the great fact of the industrial revolution. The school must assist the individual to realize his highest aspirations in the midst of industrialism. But this does not imply acceptance of the present social and

economic order as incapable of improvement. On the contrary, education becomes an agency for social reconstruction.

With these four basic principles in mind — the growth of the child rather than the demands of subject matter as the controlling factor in the school, the concept of education as experiencing, the doctrine of interest and effort, and the concept of the school as an integral part of the total social process and itself a social institution — let us briefly examine some of the trends that have been manifest in American education in the last thirty years.

1. The curriculum is undergoing radical modification. This process has consisted in part of the addition of new subject matter and activities in an effort to bring the school into closer relation with social processes and the needs of the learner. On the other hand much material that long since lost its social usefulness has been cast aside.

Making allowance for the great value of such material as McGuffey's readers, the elementary school curriculum prior to the twentieth century was a barren affair, consisting largely of formal drill in the three R's. In this century it has been greatly expanded in reading material, in the fine and in the industrial arts, the social studies, in attention to problems of health, and in numerous other directions. These changes proceed on the assumption

that the process of education at this level is not qualitatively or fundamentally different from education at any other level, and they are in harmony with the concept of education as experiencing, and of the school as a social institution. The introduction of the junior high school was fundamentally an attempt to liberalize and adjust the school more nearly to the needs of the child and of society through a broader and richer program including varied pupil activities. This process has also been marked in the high school, whose offerings in terms of so-called "practical" and "cultural" courses increase without cessation. In many ways the curriculum has been vitalized in English, science, the social studies, the arts; but in the high school, particularly in the older studies, the forces of tradition and of convention are exceedingly strong, and the whole situation is complicated by the relationship between the secondary school and the college.

2. This period has witnessed widespread experimentation in method. Increasing emphasis has been placed on significant pupil activity. Dewey in devastating sentences had focused attention on the absurdities of the traditional recitation. Attempts were made to get away from the barren formality of reciting lessons, and "pupil participation" became the cry. Twenty years ago the expression "socialized recitation" came into use, and denoted

a genuine change that was being wrought in method. Such terms as "socialized recitation," "problem method" and "project method" are expressive of a tremendous drive to find more vital and effective ways of teaching. Textbook material is undergoing a transformation in an attempt to provide subject matter that will be, as Dewey says, "spiritual food, possible nutritive material." Of far greater importance has been the emancipation from slavery to textbooks by the introduction of many books and a variety of materials that may be used by the pupils in the study of problems and in working out projects in which they are deeply interested. The library has become an integral part of every good school. The field trip is becoming an indispensable procedure. In schools everywhere pupils are working on problems as scholars work on problems, are carrying on research in an elementary way. It is impossible to overestimate the significance of this movement.

The tendency is to break the hard and fast subject matter lines that have obtained from time immemorial. Unified social studies and general science courses at the secondary level are indicative of this tendency, which has been carried much further in progressive elementary schools, where the so-called "activities curriculum" is coming into vogue, especially in the primary grades, and where subjects

are subordinated to the working out of projects involving the use of various kinds of subject matter. In 1902 Dewey said: "Our problem is rather to study the typical necessities of social life, and the actual nature of the individual in his specific needs and capacities. Our task is on one hand to select and adjust the studies with reference to the nature of the individual thus discovered; and on the other to order and group them so that they shall most definitely and systematically represent the chief lines of social endeavor and social achievement."

3. Many foreign visitors seem greatly impressed by the apparent freedom that characterizes our schools, and by the varied activities carried on by its pupils. Pupil participation in the government of the school has come to be the accepted practice. The significance of this movement is best interpreted in *Moral Principles in Education:* "The school cannot be a preparation for social life excepting as it reproduces, within itself, typical conditions of social life. . . . The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life. To form habits of social usefulness and serviceableness apart from any direct social need and motive, apart from any existing social situation, is, to the letter, teaching the child to swim by going through motions outside the water."

It is not surprising, therefore, that what was once

considered extra-curriculum is now regarded as falling entirely within the scope of the curriculum, and that much study is being given to the problem of how to make the life of the school a most effective educational instrument.

4. The tendency just noted is directly connected with the problem of moral education. In no field, in my judgment, has Dewey exerted greater influence. Over and over again he has sounded the note of self-direction. One of the chief aims of education is to enable the individual through reflective thinking to direct his own life into socially useful channels. He has little faith in formal instruction in morals: "Separation between instruction and character (is) a result of divorce between learning and doing."

Again, education comes through experience, and thinking is an instrument for the management of experience. It is largely useless to teach *about* morals or ethics: "There is nothing in the nature of ideas *about* morality, of information *about* honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct."

It cannot be doubted that these ideas have influenced the radical change in school discipline and management. The period under review has witnessed the dying gasps of corporal punishment. The old formal, arbitrary type of discipline inevitably

disappears where the school is regarded as an embryonic community. The whole matter is well summed up in a passage in *Moral Principles in Education*:

"In so far as the school represents, in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called school discipline, government, order, etc., are the expressions of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and constructive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet — so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis."

5. This doctrine of moral education is also having a pronounced influence on religious education. The religious education programs of many churches, of the Y. M. C. A. and of the Y. W. C. A., and of other religious agencies, are being made over. Emphasis is being placed on activity, on service, on serious study of current social problems and individual responsibility. Churches in increasing numbers are employing directors of religious education who have had professional training in education and who are thoroughly imbued with the principles which I have been presenting.

6. The influence of these theories is clearly discernible in present-day school buildings and equipment. The modern school contains assembly rooms, libraries, gymnasiums, shops, art rooms, dining rooms, social rooms, and many other rooms more or less specialized in character. Buildings are designed to house schools that are in fact embryonic communities. Distinct provision is made for the social life of the pupils. Notwithstanding the protest of an occasional tax-payer and well-intentioned person who looks upon such arrangements as "the fads and frills" of the new education, community after community has gone on spending millions of dollars on buildings designed to accommodate schools that represent a far greater contrast to the schools of yesterday than does a 1930 Cadillac to its crude one-cylinder predecessor of 1900.

Nothing short of a revolution has occurred in school equipment. Dewey had movable desks in his experimental school. In the first decade of this century, this type of desk was coming into vogue. By 1906 a movable desk was on the market. It was not long until great public high schools and elementary schools were being equipped throughout with movable furniture that makes for easy movement and breaks down formality.

7. A new spirit has entered into administration and supervision. At the beginning of the century

a well-administered system of public schools was a benevolent despotism which allowed the teacher little voice in the management of affairs. Courses of study, procedures of all kinds, were determined by executive fiat. But the teacher has been acquiring a new status. Democracy in administration, teacher participation in administration, are the watchwords of today. A large city school system initiates a program of continuous revision of the curriculum. Committees are appointed — composed entirely of teachers with teachers as chairmen. Specialists are employed, but the specialists serve the committees of teachers. This example is only illustrative of a participation that is both widespread and very genuine in character. In progressive school systems throughout the country teachers are becoming curriculum makers, and in other ways are contributing largely to the determination of educational practice. In 1902, on p. 30 of *The Educational Situation,* Dewey said: " As long as the teacher, who is after all the only real educator in the school system, has no definite and authoritative position in shaping the course of study, that is likely to remain an external thing to be externally applied."

This reads like a platform upon which the new administrative policies are being worked out. Research in education, higher qualifications demanded

of teachers, the development of schools of education, and other factors have contributed to this end, but the dominant influence is found in the new philosophy of education.

A philosophy regarding supervision is likewise involved. As Dewey says a few pages later on in *The Educational Situation* "It is folly to suppose that we can carry on the education of the child apart from the education of the teacher."

The teacher who has a part in the formulation of school policies and therefore has a motive for the study of the problems of education is constantly undergoing a process of education essential to good teaching. Again I quote: "It is easy to fall into the habit of regarding the mechanics of school organization and administration as something comparatively external and indifferent to educational purposes and ideals. . . . We forget that it is precisely such things (as grouping in classes, grading, machinery of curriculum making, selecting, assigning, paying and promoting teachers) that really control the whole system, even on its distinctively educational side . . . the reality of education is found in the personal and face-to-face contact of teacher and child. The conditions that underlie and regulate this contact dominate the educational situation."

8. Finally, I wish to direct your attention to the

increasing coöperation between the school and the home and other social agencies, a movement that has been greatly accentuated by the growing realization of both teachers and parents that education *is* a social process that can by no means be confined to the school, and that the interplay of school and environment outside the school cannot be overlooked. Schools everywhere are establishing agencies for maintaining contact with home and community. The growth in number and importance of parents' associations is a phenomenon whose significance can scarcely be exaggerated.

With the exception of certain experimental schools, mainly with institutional connections, such as the experimental school at the University of Chicago, and later, schools of Teachers College, Columbia University, the Merriam School at the University of Missouri, and a very few others, the more progressive public schools were first markedly influenced by the principles of education associated with the name of Dewey. This influence was distinctly felt, particularly in the West, in the first decade of the century, and was manifest through the enrichment of the curriculum, especially in the elementary schools, and through the greater spirit of freedom that began to characterize teaching and the life of the school.

In the second decade, these principles were being

accepted and tried out in public schools throughout the United States. *The Modern High School* by Charles Hughes Johnston and others, which appeared in 1914, reflects in a surprising way the extent to which the new conception of the school as a social institution was influencing secondary education, particularly in respect of the life of the school and the social content of the expanding curriculum. Extra curriculum activities and pupil participation in government were accepted as essential phases of the school's educational process. The term "socialized recitation" came into vogue at the beginning of the second decade, and the junior high school began its phenomenal development. Movable furniture began to be widely used. Most of these trends were distinctly discernible twenty years ago and were gaining headway prior to the World War. About the middle of this decade, important experimental schools were established, including in 1917 the Lincoln School of Teachers College, which, especially in its elementary division, has attempted to put into practical operation many of the principles advocated by Dewey, the experimental school of the University of Iowa, and several important progressive private schools.

It is significant that the year following the close of the World War marked the formation of the Progressive Education Association, an organization

that has become an effective influence in the reconstruction of the American school. A group of experimentally minded teachers and laymen believed that there was need for a society devoted primarily to the study and advocacy of what they called "progressive education." To my mind one of the most significant aspects of the formation of this society is found in the fact that the new theories were penetrating the private school. Many parents, dissatisfied with the formalism of existing private schools, especially of the college preparatory type, were influential in the establishment of the new schools, to a large extent drawing the personnel from progressive public schools and schools of education. The increase in the number of "progressive" private schools is a fact that may not be disregarded.

These doctrines were spread most effectively through the agency of teachers and students of educational theory in the developing schools of education who accepted in general the Dewey position. Some went over completely to this point of view, others were largely affected, and I believe it is not too much to say that all professional students of education have been affected to a considerable extent. Dr. Frank McMurry says in a letter to me: "No man in the world in my opinion has had half the influence on American education in the last forty years that Dewey has had. . . . In these two sub-

jects (the doctrine of interest and effort, and moral principles in education) and in many others I feel a great personal indebtedness to Dewey. Dr. Rein gave me my first stimulus at Jena, but Dewey has broadened and deepened what I got from Rein, so that if discipleship were in place I would now be far more a disciple of Dewey than Rein."

The influence of the McMurrys on educational practice has been marked, and the writings of Bonser, Bobbitt, Merriam, Bode, and numerous others, strongly reflect this influence. Aside from Dewey, the name most widely associated with these theories is that of one of his students, William H. Kilpatrick, a creative thinker who, through his writings, through the large classes which for nearly twenty years he has taught at Teachers College, — classes composed of teachers, school executives and supervisors from all parts of the United States and from foreign countries — and through his public lectures and discussions, is exerting a far-reaching and pronounced influence on education by stimulating thinking that is reflected in widespread experimentation with new procedures.

The mention of names and the implication of discipleship are of doubtful propriety. Each of the men whom I have named has been a constructive thinker. It seems invidious to name some and to omit others. The leading figures in the develop-

ment of a profession of school administration, such as George D. Strayer, acknowledge their debt to Dewey. It also seems unfair to omit the names of superintendents and directors of schools and other executive officers who have endeavored to put these principles into practice in the schools under their direction, such as Ella Flagg Young, superintendent of schools in Chicago from 1909 to 1915, who had studied with Dewey and shared his point of view. She exerted a marked influence on her students in the Chicago Normal School. And later as head of the Chicago schools, she was instrumental in the organization of teacher councils, and strove to make the schools of a great city more responsive to the nature of the child and to social needs. But the roll of progressive superintendents of schools is so long that the mention of others is impossible.

The 1927 Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, prepared by a committee of ten under the chairmanship of Dr. Harold Rugg, deals with the foundations and technique of curriculum making. The most notable feature of this report, a composite statement of the views of the committee on the foundations of curriculum making, embodies points of agreement and is of course a compromise, but even a cursory examination reveals the startling extent to which it is permeated by the theories that Dewey has so long advocated.

This document and the supplementary statements made by members of the committee afford abundant evidence of the widespread acceptance of these theories by leading thinkers.

The period under review has witnessed another movement of major importance — the use of scientific method in the study of education. In the broadest sense there is no conflict between Dewey's philosophy of education and the scientific movement. The natural and social sciences have made a vital contribution to his thought. In his recent address on the sources of a science of education, he takes the position that the employment of scientific techniques in the study of education is indispensable. But in *The Sources of a Science of Education*, he also urges that: "There is no more a special science of education than there is of bridge making. But material drawn from other sciences furnishes the content of educational science when it is focused on the problems that arise in education." He emphasizes the dependence of education on other sciences, especially the biological and social sciences. From the standpoint of practice he warns against too hurried, sweeping conclusions and hasty application of the findings of research. His analysis of the educative process has furnished the educational scientist with numerous problems which have become the subjects of educational research. Un-

doubtedly his writings stimulated much of the psychological research that led to the abandonment of the old doctrine of formal discipline with almost revolutionary impact on the schools.

From the standpoint of practice, however, one aspect of the scientific movement must be briefly considered — the standardized test. The widespread popularity of these tests, which inevitably emphasize the mastery of subject matter as an end in itself, may, and in the opinion of many, has, tended to crystallize and fasten on schools practices largely at variance with the theories that learning is an active, social process of rich living and experiencing, and that the primary function of subject matter is to serve as a means to growth. That the standardized test is extremely useful is not denied. That it must be used with great care to avoid overemphasis on just one aspect of learning seems perfectly clear.

What is the present status of the educational theories under discussion? Some have misconstrued the doctrine of interest and effort, and have gone to extremes in trying to make things interesting, often merely following the whims of the child. There has been much criticism of these extreme practices, but they certainly do not represent Dewey's position. In *The School and Society* in 1899 he said: "There is no ground for holding that

the teacher should not suggest anything to the child until he has consciously expressed a want in that direction."

The task of the teacher becomes far more important and far more difficult when education is viewed as a process of growth, a remaking of experience, and not as a mere cramming process. Regarding the misinterpretation and misuse of the doctrine of interest, he is equally emphatic. Again I quote: "I know of no more demoralizing doctrine — when taken literally — than the assertion of some of the opponents of interest that *after* subject matter has been selected, *then* the teacher should make it interesting."

Dewey has been criticized as an exponent of soft pedagogy. Apparently this phrase has long been in use, for I find it in a passage in *The Child and the Curriculum,* which appeared in 1902: "And very little of what goes by the name of 'discipline' and prides itself upon opposing the doctrines of a soft pedagogy and upon upholding the banner of effort and duty, is nothing more or less than just this appeal to 'interest' in its obverse aspect — to fear, to dislike of various kinds of physical, social, and personal pain. The subject matter does not appeal; it cannot appeal; it lacks origin and bearing in a growing experience. So the appeal is to the thousand and one outside and irrelevant agencies which may

serve to throw, by sheer rebuff and rebound, the mind back upon the material from which is it constantly wandering."

It is difficult to understand how Dewey can be regarded as an advocate of soft pedagogy. A school organized on the theories which he advocates would be a happy place, because children would be doing socially desirable things in which they were intensely interested, but it would throb with industrious effort. There would be work, plenty of hard work. There would be no lazy pupils.

Even a casual examination of the offering of American schools will show that the tendencies which I have briefly described are gaining greater momentum every day. The curriculum of the secondary school is a stronghold of formalism, at least as regards the popularity and content of the older studies, but there is abundant evidence that the center of gravity is slowly shifting. The last decade has been characterized by extensive experimentation with new courses and methods in liberal arts colleges and even in professional schools. Something akin to the socialized recitation or the problem method is making its appearance, directed by experimentally minded teachers and executives. One of the oldest universities of the country announces that students in the junior and senior years will make use of methods of research in the study of problems largely of

their own choosing. The old formalistic, verbalistic, cramming method still obtains even in the elementary school, but alongside the old method, in almost every grade and department an earnest attempt is being made to put into operation a more vital process of education.

In considering changes in practice, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the influences of educational thought. It is true that practice always lags behind theory, but theory nevertheless determines practice. In this period educational thought has undergone nothing short of a revolution. Not only teachers and students of education but leaders of public opinion in every walk of life have been affected by this upheaval, with the result that the popular concept of education has likewise undergone a great transformation. There is an increasing demand for a school more realistic in its processes and more sensitive to individual and social needs. The scientific movement and other influences have contributed to this changed attitude, but the most powerful influence has been that of the new pragmatic philosophy of education.

Dewey found the American school strongly entrenched in custom and tradition, still in the grip of a treadmill pedagogy that at best frustrated the child's normal impulses at almost every point; a formal, static, and unimaginative institution. In

many ways this school was admirably organized for the production of unthinking human automata. This school has not been entirely banished from our midst, but it is now everywhere on the defensive and is being transformed into a dynamic institution dedicated to childhood and through childhood to the enrichment of American life; a school in which the child will live a normal and happy life engaged in fruitful studies and activities, out of which will emerge the thoughtful, self-directed, self-disciplined, vocationally effective social being, capable of the highest appreciations and aspirations. American education is in the grip of a great transitional movement. At this close range it is difficult to appraise all of the forces that conspire to effect these changes. In large measure they must be ascribed to the influence of a creative thinker who, more than any other educational philosopher, has affected schools in his own time.

Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made to the following publishers for their courteous permission to quote in this essay from the works of John Dewey:

The University of Chicago Press —

The School and Society (1899)
The Child and the Curriculum (1902)
The Educational Situation (1902)

Houghton Mifflin Company —

Moral Principles in Education (1909)
Interest and Effort in Education (1913)

D. C. Heath and Company —
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The Macmillan Company —
Democracy and Education (1916)

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The Sources of a Science of Education (1929)

JOHN DEWEY'S INFLUENCE ON EDUCATION IN FOREIGN LANDS

By Isaac L. Kandel

Professor of Education
Teachers College, Columbia University

IT is difficult at a time when education throughout the world is passing through a period of unrest and transition to evaluate all the influences that underlie so widespread a movement. Still less is it possible to estimate the influence of an individual. The character and purposes of educational systems from the second half of the nineteenth century to the close of the War were in most countries so definitely based on national aspirations and nationalistic indoctrination as to preclude any extraneous influences that seemed to challenge the claims of the governmental authorities in charge. Administrative centralization with fixed national aims and purposes, with prescribed curricula and courses of study, and with uniform methods was deliberately set against innovations. It is worth noting that the elementary school programs remained virtually unchanged in Prussia from 1872 until the post-war reconstruction, and in France from 1887 to 1923. The theorist was free to theorize and dream his educational Utopias; practice followed the dictates of

the authorities. Private initiative in education, if not rigorously controlled, was dominated by the indirect imposition of examination requirements and teacher certification, while teacher preparation was strictly controlled by regulations and prescriptions in order to produce a teacher of the desired pattern, the craftsman skilled in carrying the prescriptions into the classroom. It is significant that the first experiments that ushered in the new school movement began under the freer administrative atmosphere of England at Abbotsholme and Bedales and that the influence spread thence to Germany in the *Landerziehungsheime* and to France in the *Ecole des Roches*.

There were, besides, other retarding influences that militated against the introduction of new ideas in education. The traditional emphasis on knowledge and information, in many places on encyclopedism, combined with the social and economic privileges that were awarded for book learning, developed a certain attitude of mind on the part of the public that the function of the school is to impart nothing more than a definite round of knowledge. Nor did the new psychology find a sufficiently strong foothold in the institutions for the preparation of teachers to bring about any modifications of importance either in outlook or in practice. At the same time the general attitude that has prevailed

abroad towards the philosophy of pragmatism did not tend to render educators receptive to its educational implications. Furthermore, the prevailing prejudices on American intellectual life did not predispose the European to look favorably on either American theory or American practice as models worthy of study or of imitation. Finally, it was not easy for the casual visitor from abroad to discern the influence of any particular philosophy in American education; in the field of education an ounce of practice would have had a greater effect on the practitioner than a pound of theory. It must be remembered that even in this country it is only within some twenty years that the imagination of the American schoolman has been stirred by Dewey's philosophy of education, even though it was so essentially an outcome and interpretation of American life.

No apology is necessary for this somewhat lengthy explanation of the reasons for the difficulty in appraising Dewey's influence abroad. And yet by a coincidence interest in Dewey is developing in accordance with his own principles of thinking; if foreign educators are beginning to show an interest in his work and influence, it is in response to a *felt need*. Education has everywhere reached a fork in the road; the few tentative gropings in a new direction that were made before the War are becoming realities; old traditions and old practices are every-

where being questioned; and everywhere the tendencies seem to center around the same aims. This movement is marked by the following characteristics. In place of the strict centralization of educational systems with their rigid emphasis on definitely prescribed standards in methods, courses of study, and attainments, there is a demand for decentralization and freedom for local determination. In place of the rigid control of the teachers there is a movement for more freedom, for more initiative, for a greater recognition of the teacher as an educational scientist rather than as a craftsman. Prescribed courses of study are giving way to outlines and suggestions to be adapted by the teacher in accordance with the character of the school and its environment. More general is the attack on knowledge for its own sake and especially on knowledge unrelated to the life and needs of the pupil. In place of learning as synonymous with seat and book work, or assimilation at the teacher's dictation, there is a demand for new methods that will put the pupil in a position to learn through his own interest in a problem, while the rigid pupil-teacher relationship is to be replaced by the class and school as a coöperative community.

Fundamentally, then, the basic principles in which these demands have their origin are three: greater respect for the individuality of the child,

the school as a social institution, and activity as the process of learning. It is now recognized that the new democracies must educate not subjects but free and responsible individuals living in close relations to the world around them, able to play their parts in its everyday work, and capable of interpreting it in relation to their own lives. This means, first, that the school must reflect society and at the same time be a society; and, secondly, that each pupil must be regarded as a growing personality. The walls of the school are being broken down; the school from which the regulations formerly excluded parents now recognizes that its welfare depends on closer coöperation between parents and teachers. For the present these movements and demands are aspirations only, although there are sufficient examples of their incorporation into practice.

Up to the present the new aims have in the main affected principally the education of the masses. And yet there are stirrings in the secondary field too. Everywhere there is unrest and dissatisfaction with the traditional conceptions of culture and of liberal education. The democratic strivings for secondary schools for all lead logically to a new orientation in which the narrow academic definition of culture must yield to a redefinition in the light of modern social and economic organization. What is cultural and what is vocational are being subjected to a rein-

terpretation, although at present the steps are somewhat tentative and uncertain.

There is still another field in which the new movements promise far-reaching changes. The attempts to impose European standards and practices on backward peoples have at last been recognized as ludicrous. Here, too, the basic starting point is the principle that education is not synonymous with booklearning but implies teaching how to live — and that in relation to the environment of the peoples to be educated.

A certain similarity will be found between these tendencies and the educational philosophy of Dewey. How far these tendencies have been influenced directly by Dewey or indirectly by American pedagogy it would be hazardous to guess. To the average teachers abroad, especially in the elementary schools, the major portions of his writings have been inaccessible because of the teachers' lack of familiarity with English; the secondary school teacher and the university professor have not, as a rule, been interested in educational reform of a fundamental character. The absence of centers for the study of education as a university subject was a further limitation on the spread of his ideas. Thus there was left the individual student of educational theory who was sufficiently venturesome to explore abroad. Perhaps the only key that is available to

indicate the interest in Dewey's writings is to be found in the number of translations. It is significant that more of Dewey's educational works have been translated than of his contributions to pure philosophy. Translations have appeared of practically all of his educational writings. One or more have been published in most of the European languages — French, German, Russian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish — and in Arabic, Turkish, Chinese, and Japanese, while special editions of his earlier works have been published in England. The literature about Dewey has been slight, but it is noteworthy that of fourteen articles or books on his educational theory the majority are of recent date, although the first goes back as far as 1901, when an American student wrote for the doctor's degree in a German university a dissertation on Dewey's doctrine of interest.

There is, however, every evidence that the interest in educational reform everywhere and the search for light and leadership are directing increasing attention to the contribution of Dewey. It is admitted that the first stimulus for educational reform in Russia, which antedated the Revolution by nearly ten years, was obtained some twenty years ago by Zelenko's familiarity with Dewey's work; through Zelenko and through a study of Dewey's writings Shatsky was inspired to undertake his educational ex-

periment; more recent developments have tended to give to education in Russia its particular local and political coloration, and external influence is disclaimed. The reform of education in Mexico shows definite traces of the same inspiration, while in Turkey Professor Dewey has served as the official adviser on the reorganization of the educational system. In China Dewey's principles have been one of the guiding factors in the reform of education in general and in the inauguration of a number of experimental schools. His lectures delivered during his stay in China of two years were printed and passed through ten editions in a short time, so that every Chinese educator who wished to be modern adopted the slogan that "Education is life and the school is a society." Similar influences are evident in the liberal movements that are now beginning to bear fruit in Japan. In India widespread attention has been attracted to an educational experiment conducted by an American educator in the practical application of Dewey's theories, while another experiment conducted by an American disciple in Ceylon has shaken the authorities out of their complacent acceptance of tradition.

In all these countries the philosophy of Dewey was carried abroad by former students influenced by him directly or indirectly by his followers; in some of them Professor Dewey has, on invitation, given series

of lectures. In England we have it on the authority of Professor Nunn that Dewey has been one of the educational leaders who "did much to emancipate the professional intelligence of the present generation of teachers." So far as Germany is concerned, Erich Hylla, an official in the Prussian Ministry of Education and author of a recent work on American education, pays a tribute to the influence of Dewey's educational philosophy which reached Germany indirectly through Kerschensteiner; and Kerschensteiner himself makes the following statement in his *Autobiography,* "Dewey's practical proposals for organization coincide to a great extent with mine, and the clarity and lucidity of his thinking on education have on many occasions given me the courage to try out my own ideas. Many of my ideas, when still somewhat obscure, have been clarified through the intensive study of his writings." But with one or two exceptions Dewey's writings have remained unknown to German students unfamiliar with English, a defect which is about to be corrected by the publication of Hylla's translation of *Democracy and Education.* The International Conference on education, especially that of the New Education Fellowship, are focusing marked attention on American education and the forces that have made it and will inevitably lead to more widespread study of its leading philosopher and in-

terpreter. Similar results may be expected from the growing interest abroad in American life and thought and the exchange of educational visits. Thus many of the two thousand foreign students who have passed through Teachers College will undoubtedly have been affected by Dewey's works.

When it is recalled that the realization of Dewey's theories in the practice of this country has been achieved mainly in the last fifteen or twenty years, the extent of the interest already manifested abroad in his writings is but a forecast of the influence that they will most certainly exercise in the ferment of thought on education that marks the present period. If it has been impossible to refer to this or that tangible realization in school practice, it has been because, unlike other leaders who now occupy the educational stage, he has refrained from reducing his theories to a practical formula, definite and applicable under all conditions and circumstances. It is characteristic of his contributions to the philosophy of education that Dewey does not insist on the *ipsissima verba magistri* so much as on stimulating thought, on the development of a critical attitude, and on the application of individual effort to the solution of problems as they are recognized; and it is through this general ferment that his influence is most likely to be enduring, both in this country and abroad.

THE PHILOSOPHIES OF ROYCE, JAMES, AND DEWEY IN THEIR AMERICAN SETTING

By George H. Mead
Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago

THAT part of North America to which our forefathers came, the Atlantic coast from Maine to Florida, and that ever receding frontier of which they progressively took possession, that frontier that was at last arrested by the Pacific stretching from Washington to southern California, this farstretching country defines in geography and history the community of the United States of America. But while historical geography thus draws its boundaries and marks out the set of its vast adventure, it does not define and exhibit the mind that was formed within this American community and that informed and shaped the course of that adventure.

It was a mind that brought with it from Europe habits already formed of ecclesiastical and political self-government. The dominant habits were those of Puritanism, and the democracy of the town meeting. The philosophy of Puritanism is indicated in the phrase, thrift and righteousness. Cal-

vinism had found a place for business within its spiritual economy. It could find the blessing of God in what the medieval Church had called usury. It opened the door to a Capitalistic *régime*. God had given men property and blessed them in its increase, and punished the unprofitable steward by taking away even that which he had. In England, the Puritans and their successors from whom the American colonists came remained after the Restoration a subordinate part of the nation. The monarchy, parliament and the courts, and the social hierarchy from which their functionaries were drawn, bore witness to old feudal habits that still controlled the national life, set the standards of conduct, gave form to social values, and furnished their emotional resonance. The culture of England's ruling class, sprung from an unbroken history, dominated the spiritual life of the community. When the colonies threw off their allegiance to the English crown and entered the family of independent nations, they had brought about a change which was even more profound than their political revolution. They had changed the character of the state which gave the former colonists their political consciousness. When they recognized themselves as citizens it was no longer as members of the English social hierarchy. For this they had substituted a political national structure which was a logical development

of the town meeting. The state has never impressed itself upon the American citizen. It is nothing but the extension in representative form of the political habits of the town meeting. The caucus and the political boss stand so largely for its *modus operandi* that it commands little weight of inherited respect. It was not until the national state became a practical necessity in the administration and distribution of public lands that it became an essential part of the political consciousness of the community west of the Alleghenies. Then it could be appealed to for the development of roads, canals, and railways. Apart from these the pioneers continued to govern themselves in the fashion of town meetings. Any man was qualified for an office if he could secure the votes for his election. And the astonishing thing was that it worked so well. Thinly spread over a vast continent, these nexus of town meetings not only governed themselves in rough and ready fashion, but organized states which were organic parts of the United States and the fundamental reality of it in men's consciousness was baptized in blood. But the reality of it grew out of the solution of their problems. It was a union that had to be achieved, not one that could be brought out like an invisible writing in men's ancient inherited experience. The habit of self-government in local affairs was an inherited English method, but the creation of a national state

out of these habits was purely American. Despite two revolutions English society had preserved the outward form of a state which symbolized its unity in the forms of feudal loyalties, while the power had been shifted to a parliament within which the representatives of new groups were given a voice in governmental control. But these representatives belonged to a hereditary ruling class who fused their representation of a rising democracy with the historic traditions of the English Gentleman — the essence of English Liberalism. Within the community the men whom commerce and industry had clothed with new demands placed these demands in the keeping of those who had the historic tradition and training. So the as-yet-unfranchised voters and the non-conformists could find their articulate spokesman in so typical an English gentleman and so vivid a Churchman as Gladstone. The education and social training which we call culture was in the minds of Englishmen an essential part of the consciousness of the state. Carlyle wanted to deepen it into a religion, and Disraeli saw in it not only the opportunity of Tory democracy but of a far-flung imperialism. The state could be realized not only in the symbolic person of the monarch but also in the dependence of the masses upon those whose training and social position gifted their representatives with the right to fight their battles within the an-

cient structure of the state. It was not only the military victories of England that were won on the fields of her Public Schools. The historical and functional universality of the state could be still incarnated in a social feudal structure. The training, the culture, and the ideas of its upper classes were essential factors even in the political struggles which democratized its government.

It is, I think, necessary to recall this fundamental difference between the American and English communities, if we are to understand the part played in our life by a culture which in one sense is as much English as American.

These differences of attitude in the corresponding groups in the English and the American communities stand out most sharply, if we recognize that in England they were dominant elements in the middle class which was fighting its way to a controlling political position, a middle class which stood between a lower class of tenants, farm laborers and the industrial proletariat of the manufacturing cities on the one side, and the upper class of gentility, nobility, and the crown above them on the other. In American society there was nothing below them and nothing above them. They did not have to convince a community of ancient tradition that their control would not sacrifice the values woven into its social structure and hallowed by its history. If the Ameri-

can Puritan was freed from the oppositions of his English fellow, he was freed also from the necessity of deepening his philosophy to meet the demands of a more varied community. He had problems enough, but these did not include that of justifying his way of life and the principles underlying his view of the world to powerful hostile parts of his own community. This type of English individualism was set free to propagate itself on a great continent without its natural enemies.

It was an individualism which placed the soul over against his Maker, the pioneer over against society, and the economic man over against his market. The relations were largely contractual. Behind it lay a simplified religious philosophy, a theology, in which dogmatic answers were given to questionings as to the purpose of the world, the future of the human soul, moral obligations, and social institutions. Its Calvinism had separated Church and State. It had come to terms with the Newtonian revolution and eighteenth-century enlightenment. Popular education and economic opportunity sprang naturally from its social attitude and its geographical situation. It was the distillation of the democracy inherent in Calvinism and the Industrial Revolution at liberty to expand and proliferate for a century without the social problems which beset it in Europe. The American pioneer was spiritually stripped for

the material conquest of a continent and the formation of a democratic community.

It has not been, therefore, either in the fields of philosophic reflection and aesthetic appreciation or in that of historic retrospect that the American has sought for the import of his political activity. His most comprehensive institutions of social control and organization have found their reason for existence in the immediate problems of the community. The same is true of the economic life of the community. Success in business has not meant entrance into time-honored ruling classes. In no country in the world has striking success in business been so occupied with the economic organization and development in the economic processes themselves. Those larger communities which political and economic activities have always implied and involved, and which the historic relations of members of the European nations have in some sort very characteristically expressed, have had little or no existence in the retrospect and historic structure of the American mind, with which to dignify and build out the import of activities which transcend their immediate field.

It has followed that the values of these social processes have been found in the achievements they have immediately secured or in the interest in the activities themselves, and as the immediate ends in poli-

tics and business are inadequate expressions of their values in the community the ideal phase of politics and business has been found in the process rather than in their objectives. This implicit philosophy has been inarticulate. That it is there is evidenced in the social values which have permeated and controlled political and economic life in America, values which have transcended our politics and our business. The advance which has been achieved in our society has in the main been due neither to leadership nor to ideas. There have been a few outstanding exceptions; but, by and large, I think this is true of the history of the community of the United States. And yet we have inherited the literature, the philosophy, and the art of the Europe from which we separated ourselves in our political and economic undertakings. It was a culture which did not root in the active life of the community. The colleges, which were the natural habitats of this culture, which should therefore have endowed with this culture those who were going out into the active life of the community, were not the centers from which the politicians and business men of the community were drawn. In the earlier years of our history it trained a larger percentage of the clergymen than of any other calling, but the separation of church and state was too profound not only in our institutions but also in our social attitudes to allow the

church to be a dominant force in the direction of the onward life of the community.

It is this break between the culture and the directive forces in the community that was characteristic of the century and a quarter of the history of the mind of America. It stands out in all expressions of this culture, but it is to its import in philosophy that I wish to draw attention.

In eighteenth-century thought science had discovered laws in nature and assumed them to exist in social processes. As God enacted them in nature, let the monarch enact them in society, and personal obligation to these monarchs would ensure their operation in church and state. It was the undertaking of the romantic philosophies to fuse these two principles of social control into one. Nature was rational and society was rational. The principle of control was reason, but this controlling reason could be found only in an inclusive self that contained nature and society. Contrariety, the irrational, contradiction, evil and sin, in nature and men could only be overcome by the wider experience within which these disappear in the rational. What the romantic philosophy undertook was to find this process, in which the contradictions disappear in the higher synthesis, within the experience of the individual mind; but as the solution must be already achieved in the timeless process of the infinite, the

finite mind could find no direction for its conduct within its own reason. It could only realize itself in taking its place within so much of the transcendent whole as was evident in its experience. As that experience widened we could realize more and more of that infinite whole, but we had no such intelligent process within ourselves as would enable us to take the helm into our own hands and direct the course of our own conduct, either in thought or action. Still it was a romantic philosophy that was warm with the inner life of the self, and it vivified the past by reliving it. It brought romance into history and philosophy.

This romantic philosophy was reflected in America in Emerson and the members of the Concord School, but in America it answered neither to the program of the Absolute Idealists that sought to sweep all activities of the spirit, scientific, aesthetic, religious and political within the logic of the development of the self, nor to the undertaking of Carlyle to find within the depths of the self a principle of feudal leadership that could guide English society out of the wastes of the Industrial Revolution. It was allied in America to the clerical revolt against Calvinism and brought with it a romantic discovery of a self that could interpret nature and history by identifying itself with their processes. It was worked out neither in the logic of thought

and social organization, nor with the demands of immediate social problems. It was a part of American culture, a culture which was fundamentally European. But the American became self-conscious in his belief that he had broken with the structure of European society. He felt himself to be hostile to the society from which his culture sprang. Nor was this break between culture and social activities mended by the literature of the New England group. This was shot through with a nostalgia for the richer and profounder spiritual experience across the Atlantic. It followed from this situation that culture in America was not an interpretation of American life. And yet the need for interpretation was present in American consciousness, and the lack of a competent native culture was recognized. I believe that there is no more striking character of American consciousness than this division between the two great currents of activity, those of politics and business on the one side, and the history, literature, and speculation which should interpret them on the other.

This culture appeared then in the curricula of American schools and colleges. There was no other to put in its place. America's native culture accepted the forms and standards of European culture. It was frankly imitative. It was confessedly inferior not different. It was not indigenous. The cultivated American was a tourist even if he never

left American shores. When the American felt the inadequacy of the philosophy and art native to the Puritan tradition his revolt took him abroad in spirit if not in person; but he was still at home, for he was an exponent of the only culture the community possessed.

When the great speculative mind of Josiah Royce appeared in a Californian mining camp and faced the problem of good and evil and examined the current judgments and the presuppositions back of them, he inevitably turned to the great philosophies of *outre mer,* in his dissatisfaction with the shallow dogmatism of the church and the college of the pioneer. In all European philosophies since the time of Descartes the problem of knowledge had been central, the problem of relating the cognitive experience of the individual mind to the great structures of the physical universe which Newtonian science presented, and of the moral universe which western society in its states and churches predicated. Some of these structures were new and some were old, and at various points they clashed with each other. The scientific presentations demanded acceptance on the basis of objective evidence. When they clashed with inherited institutional dogma the individual had to find within himself, if he attempted to think out his problem, the reason for acceptance or rejection. If the clash came between scientific doctrines evidence

could be obtained from the findings. The scientist was not thrown back upon his own mind. But if the conflict arose between the dogmas in social institutions and scientific doctrine no such appeal could be made to accepted findings. Western thought presupposed an ordered, intelligible, moral universe. Its ordered intelligible character — that is, its uniformity — enabled the mind to test its scientific findings, but its moral order presupposed a supreme end or purpose in which the purposes of voluntary individuals could appear as elements of an organized whole. However no such ordered moral whole is given by which one may test his individual purpose. The same might be said of intelligible nature. No complete universe is given by which the scientist may test his hypothesis. But the scientist is quite willing to accept the experimental test of his hypothesis. His experience thus becomes a part of the objective world of science. For no modern scientists has scepticism been a practical problem. But the western world has been obsessed with the conception of a moral order with which the individual will must accord if the individual is to be moral. The scientist is not the less scientific because the hypothesis which he has brought to the experimental test is later proved to be incorrect. But the moral individual is good or bad as he has or has not conformed to the given moral order, and yet his judgment is

fallible. Only Kant's rigorous but empty categorical imperative offers a seemingly logical escape from the dilemma. As it proved in the case of Kant and his idealistic successors, the established institutions of society offer the only palpable expressions of such a given moral order. Here scepticism is a practical problem. And it was out of an attempted solution of the relation of the individual will and its purpose to a given all-inclusive aim of the absolute will that Royce's idealism arose.

Such scepticism has had its place in the American community, but it has belonged mainly to the adolescent over against the claims of the dogma of the church. It has not been reflected in the general attitude of a community engaged in the reconstruction of its institutions. A striking difference between the spiritual lives of Europe and America, since the American revolution, is that a continuous process of revolution and reconstruction was going on in Europe while American institutions have been subject to no conscious reconstruction. The values embodied in the institutions of the European communities were felt to be profoundly threatened, or revolutionary parties sought to restate them in their own programs, or political and social reformers insisted that the changes they sought would not imperil them. In the background of all thought lay these values, and it is this sense of them in the face

of the profound changes that were going on that gave to Europe in the nineteenth century its peculiar character. This same culture brought to American shores lacked this background of social reconstruction. It was foreign, and yet it was our only culture. The dominance of middle-class ideals of contractual freedom, of political democracy, of freedom of the school from the church, these were commonplaces in American consciousness. The insurgence of these concepts and attitudes into an old feudally ordered society gave a rich setting for novelist, poet, and historian. The cultured American had to become a European to catch the flavor. He had to get another soul, as does the man who has learned a new vernacular or who has travelled in foreign parts. Our own bitter struggle to abolish slavery that the country might remain a united community found little to illuminate and interpret it in this culture. The problem was not a European problem. Scepticism had a profound social import in Europe. The free thinker was not simply one who criticized theological dogma. He was libertarian in a political sense and was thought to be endangering all institutions. It is only necessary to reflect upon socialism in Europe, and to think of the meaninglessness of it in the American community during the nineteenth century, to bring out vividly in consciousness the profound difference between the Euro-

pean and the American minds. The result of this was that while there was a cultured group in the community, and while culture was sought vividly in institutions of learning, in lyceums and clubs, it did not reflect the political and economic activities which were fundamental in American life. We realize that Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel each stood for a phase of the reconstruction that was going on in the German community, and we realize that this romantic idealism was not so foreign to the English community that Green could not draw a new and living sense of the individual in the community and the social reality that expressed itself in the individual from this idealism. But one cannot dream of that philosophy interpreting the relation of the American individual to society. And yet the American philosopher had to acquire his detachment of thought, his sense of the philosophic problem and his training in philosophic disciplines in these European philosophies. They were of course as much his as were the medieval doctrines of Thomas and Scotus, or the philosophies of Greece. But Royce did not present the problems of American consciousness in the terms of the older philosophies. They were recognizedly distant in history, but he did present the problem of the relation of the American individual to his universe, physical and moral, in terms of the absolute idealism that was at

home in a German, almost a Prussian, soil. It is only in a community in which personal subordination is sublimated into identification of the self with the larger social whole, where feudal social organization still persists, that romantic idealism can interpret the immediate problem of the individual to the world. It was the passionate struggle of Royce's great mind to fashion, in his philosophy of Loyalty, an expression of this idealism which would fit the problem of American thought. He was obliged to take it into the vernacular of the church, where alone scepticism had a meaning, to seek for reverberations from Calvinistic and Pauline conceptions. His individual was voluntaristic; the judgment was an expression of purpose. His individual is American in his attitude, but he calls upon this American to realize himself in an intellectual organization of conflicting ends that is already attained in the absolute self, and there is nothing in the relation of the American to his society that provides any mechanism that even by sublimation can accomplish such a realization. Not even in the Blessed Community, with Royce's social analysis of the self, does Royce lay hands upon an American social attitude that will express his undertaking. Causes, loyalty to which unites the man to the group, so far from fusing themselves with higher causes till loyalty reaches an ultimate loyalty to loyalty, remain particular

and seek specific ends in practical conduct, not resolution in an attained harmony of disparate causes at infinity. Nor does Royce's stroke of genius — the infinite series involved in self-representation — reflect the self-consciousness of the American individual. The same remark may be made upon Royce's doctrine of interpretation. In each of these conceptions Royce points out that the individual reaches the self only by a process that implies still another self for its existence and thought. If the structure of reality that is organized about the self in the social process is already there, the concept affords a striking picture of its infinity. The logical implication, empty in itself, can interpret a structure — if the structure is there — and reveal its character. But the American even in his religious moments did not make use of his individualism — his self-consciousness — to discover the texture of reality. He did not think of himself as arising out of a society, so that by retiring into himself he could seize the nature of that society. On the contrary, the pioneer was creating communities and ceaselessly legislating changes within them. The communities came from him, not he from the community. And it followed that he did not hold the community in reverent respect.

We are not likely to exaggerate the critical importance of religion, as the carrier of the funda-

mental standards of social conduct, in the building up of the great American community, but it belonged to the character of the pioneer that his religious principles and doctrines, like his political principles and doctrines, were put into such shape that he could carry them about with him. They were part of the limited baggage with which he could trek into the unpeopled West. He was not interested in their origins or the implications of those origins, but in the practical uses to which they could be put. And no American, in his philosophical moments, regarding the secretarian meetinghouses of a western community would have felt himself at home in a spiritual landscape of Royce's Blessed Community. Notwithstanding Royce's intense moral sense and his passionate love of the community from which he came and to which he continued to belong, his philosophy belonged, in spite of himself, to culture and to a culture which did not spring from the controlling habits and attitudes of American society. I can remember very vividly the fascination of the Idealisms in Royce's luminous presentations. They were a part of that great world of *outre mer* and exalted my imagination as did its cathedrals, its castles, and all its romantic history. It was part of the escape from the crudity of American life, not an interpretation of it.

In the psychological philosophy of William James,

on the other hand, we find purpose explaining and elucidating our cognition, rather than setting up a metaphysical problem which can only be solved by positing an infinite intellect. James's chapter on the concept is the source of his later pragmatism, and of the pregnant ideas which both Royce and Dewey confess that they owe to him. The passage from the percept to the concept is by way of attentive selection, and the source of this attentive selection must be found in the act. Knowledge predicates conduct, and conduct sets the process within which it must be understood. Royce admits it, and considers the judgment an act, and then proceeds to draw metaphysical conclusions, if the universe is a moral universe. But for James the act is a living physiological affair, and must be placed in the struggle for existence, which Darwinian evolution had set up as the background of life. Knowledge is an expression of the intelligence by which animals meet the problems with which life surrounds them. The orientation of knowledge is changed. Its efficacy can be determined not by its agreement with a pre-existent reality but by its solution of the difficulty within which the act finds itself. Here we have the soil from which pragmatism sprang. Both Royce and James were influenced by the science of their period. Royce was affected by mathematical science at the point at which mathematics

and logic coalesce, and he was a considerable figure in the development of symbolic logic. James's medical training brought him under the influence of the biological sciences. But back of this lay James's own individual problem — the scepticism of adolescence set in a long period of illness that sickened both body and mind. What could he believe that would give him the assurance with which to face life? He demanded the right to believe that he might live. There must be a meaning in life that transcended the mechanistic conception of it which the biological sciences presented. Renouvier fortified him in his refusal to surrender the will to mechanism. The mechanistic doctrine could not be proved, and his own will to believe pulled him out the pit and granted him an assurance.

James, though born in New York, was a New Englander. New England was the seat of the Puritan tradition and also the seat of culture, both that of the old world and that which had continued to flourish in America. He had the keenest aesthetic response and had even tentatively addressed himself to the artist's life. Residence abroad had equipped him with European languages and made him at home in Europe, as he was at home in Boston and Harvard, but his mental and moral citizenship was in America, as that of his brother Henry was not. In his own experience he was not

aware of the break between the profound processes of American life and its culture. He was not of pioneer stock. He condemned the crudity, the political corruption, the materialism of American life, but he condemned it as an American. It was perhaps because the solution that he sought for his own problems did not take him to foreign systems, that it was out of his own physiology and psychology that he felt his way to an intellectual and moral world within which he could live, that the cleavage between life and culture did not appear in his philosophy. His philosophy was a native American growth. The adolescent scepticism with which his mental struggles began was common to American youth who thought at all, and he found and fashioned within himself the weapons with which to defeat it. He lived and thought freely. If any man's culture has been a part of himself this was true of James. He carried no burden of learning or critical apparatus, and he was instinctively responsive to what was native to other people. Like Goethe he was at home in any circle, but without Goethe's sophistication. And yet he remained a New Englander, as far as American life was concerned. The principle of his solution was found in the individual soul. His was a lofty individualism. He was ready to go to the help of the Lord against the mighty, and called on others to go with him, but it was as

individuals they were to go, to bring more moral order into a pluralistic unfinished universe.

He heralded the scientific method in philosophy. The test of the hypothesis was in its working, and all ideas were hypotheses. Thinking was but a part of action, and action found its completion and its standards in consequences. He adopted Pierce's laboratory habit of mind. But what were the conquences? In the laboratory of the scientist the hypothesis — the idea — is fashioned in terms of anticipated consequences. The experiment must be adjusted to certain prevised events, if the experiment is to say anything. The control of conduct is as essential in the formation of ideas as in the culmination of the act which tests them. And here lies the whole case of pragmatism in its interpretation of knowledge, for if the idea comes into the act, without becoming a part of the apparatus for intelligent control in this situation, the consequences will not test the truth of the idea. They will reveal nothing but the attitude of the individual. Now from the early days in which James was fighting for a foothold of assurance in living, through the poignant thought brought to expression in the *Will to Believe,* in his profoundly sympathetic analysis of *Types of Religious Experience,* and in the lectures on Pragmatism, James faced ideas of freedom of the will, of God and the moral order of the universe,

which demanded acceptance of the individual, at the peril of the loss of the values they subtend. And James fought to make the attitude of the individual in these crises pragmatic evidence of the truth of these ideas. This led to the ambiguous term, satisfaction as the test of truth. This predisposition inevitably blurred his analysis of knowledge in conduct and the nature of the idea. For all of his analysis of the self, James's individual remained a soul — in his article on the Moral Philosopher, and even in his celebrated chapter on Habit. It entered in advance of the situation it helped to determine. It carried standards and criteria within itself. It was still the American individual that had fashioned the ecclesiastical and political community within which it lived, though James was a New Englander and no pioneer and lived in a community old enough to have its own culture, though it was a culture that was in great measure sterile in the development of the larger American Community. His individual had that in him which was not fashioned in the living process in which his intelligence arose.

John Dewey was also a New Englander like James, and like Royce he was intellectually bred in the idealisms of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and can say today that "If there be a synthesis in ultimate Being of the realities which can be cognitively substantiated and of meanings which should com-

mand our highest admiration and approval, then concrete phenomena . . . ought to be capable of being exhibited as definite manifestations of the eternal union of the real-ideal," though today this is for Dewey a condition contrary to fact. But while Royce went to Harvard, Dewey went to the University of Michigan. Both Dewey and Royce published psychologies, though Dewey's came earlier in the development of his thought, and constituted in its treatment of the will and the emotions an early step in the formulation of conduct as the field of experience. Like Royce, Dewey was profoundly influenced by James's psychology, though as I have already indicated it suggested to him a method of interpretation of knowledge rather than a metaphysical problem to be worked out in Hegelian fashion. As in the case of James, it was biological science with its dominant conception of evolution that offered him a process within which to analyze and place intelligence.

It would however be an error to ascribe to James's psychology the starting point of Dewey's independent thought. In his *Outline of Ethics,* 1891, in which are to be found the essential positions of his ethical doctrine, among his many acknowledgments to English idealistic and naturalistic writers, he makes no reference to James; and yet here we find him denouncing the "fallacy that moral action

means something more than action itself." Here we find the "one moral reality — the full free play of human life," the "analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment," and the "idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession." How far he had travelled from his earlier position appears from the following passage from an article printed in 1884. He there "declares that God, as the perfect Personality or Will, is the only Reality, and the source of all activity. It is therefore the source of all activity of the individual personality. The Perfect Will is the motive, source and realization of the life of the individual. He has renounced his own particular life as an unreality; he has asserted that the sole reality is the universal Will, and in that reality all his actions take place." * In the *Outlines of Ethics* we find the will, the idea, and the consequences all placed inside of the act, and the act itself placed only within the larger activity of the individual in society.

All reference of knowledge to a pre-existent ideal reality has disappeared. Knowledge refers to consequences imagined or experienced. Dewey passed out of his idealistic position by the way of the psychological analysis of the moral act. He occupied

* I am indebted for this quotation to the thesis of Dr. Maurice Baum, entitled *A Comparative Study of the Philosophies of William James and John Dewey.*

himself with the function of knowledge in doing. Instead of finding in the conflict of aims a problem, that knowledge can solve only in an absolute will, it becomes the immediate moral problem of the individual within the act. And his next step was by way of the school, in which he subjected his philosophy to the more severe test of actual accomplishments in education. He accepted the headship of the department of philosophy at the University of Chicago upon the condition that it should include that of Education, and his earliest steps in the new field were in the establishment of the Experimental School, in which the education of the children was worked out upon the principle that knowing is a part of doing.

Now Pragmatism is recognized as a part of a current of thought which has had other expressions in other communities. Elsewhere in particular it has been allied with an anti-intellectualism, as for example in Bergson's philosophy.

Two characteristics of this phase of modern thought may be noted, one the reference of thought to conduct, and the other the inclusion of intelligence within the sweep of biologic evolution. That these should lead to anti-intellectualism implies that intelligence and thought are not so native to human conduct and behavior even in their most elaborate social expressions, but that they deform experience.

In other words, it is assumed that thought has the function not only of facilitating conduct but also of presenting reality as well. Even a theory of knowledge cannot serve two masters, and it was the task of freeing cognition from the shackles of a divided allegiance which Dewey accomplished in his *Essays in Experimental Logic*. Here Pierce's laboratory habit of mind follows through the whole process of knowing. In particular it is exhibited in elaboration of the problem from which it starts upon its experimental undertaking. In isolating the sense data, and the relations, which the conflicts of experience have shaken out, in sharp logical distinction from the non-problematic world within which it arises, Dewey exempts the logical process that is seeking knowledge from any responsibility for the world that has set the problem. It frees having, enjoying, and suffering, and the percept, as the statement of the object that is simply there from a consciousness *of*, and the way is opened for the more complete analysis of consciousness in *Experience and Nature*. The gist of it is that what had been already achieved for the moral act was now established for the act of knowing; and if cognition is not responsible for the world that sets the problem, still less is it called upon to read back into a pre-existent reality its accomplishment in the solution of its problem, the "fallacy of conversion of eventual functions into

antecedent existence." In *Experience and Nature* the parallellism between the analysis of the moral act and the cognitive act is completed. As it is shown in the former that it is in social participation that the peculiar character of the moral appears, so in the latter it is through the participation that is involved in communication, and hence in thought itself, that meaning arises. There is a grand simplicity in the advance from the *Syllabus and Outline of Ethics* in 1891 to *Experience and Nature* and *The Quest for Certainty* in 1929.

As Whitehead has admonished us, "Seek for simplicity and then distrust it." It is a wise admonition, but before we address ourselves to the subtle problems and the difficult readjustments which any great reconstruction brings with it, we may stop to enjoy the sense of enormous relief with which one completes *The Quest for Certainty*. That baffled sense of the philosophic squirrel running a ceaseless dialectical round within his cage, that despairing sense of the philosophic Sisyphus vainly striving to roll the heavily weighted world of his reflexion up into a pre-existent reality — these drop away and the philosopher can face about toward the future and join in the scientist's adventure. Not the eagerness to grapple with a dialectical opponent, not the sense of escape into a City not built with hands, but the sense of freedom for action — it is a novel attitude

in which to lay down a profound philosophic treatise.

It has been a term of opprobrium that has been cast upon Dewey's doctrine that it is the philosophy of American practicality. But now that the world has become somewhat more respectful of us and more curious about us, it may not, perhaps, be opprobrious to recognize the relation of Dewey's habitat to his philosophic output. In the first place it was beyond the Alleghenies that he formulated his problem and worked out the essentials of his doctrine. Though Hegelianism flourished in a small and somewhat Teutonic group in St. Louis, which was not without its repercussions in America, as witness both Royce and Dewey, it was Royce who established the Absolute Idealisms in American thought by making them a part of culture. There was no sublimation of the individual in the structure of society in America which could make absolute idealism an outgrowth of American consciousness, but as a part of culture it took its place, and the center of gravity of this culture was in New England. I have indicated what seems to me the important characteristic of American life, the freedom, within certain rather rigid but very wide boundaries, to work out immediate politics and business with no reverential sense of a pre-existing social order within which they must take their place and whose values they must preserve. We refer to this as individualism, perhaps

uncouth, but unafraid. In its finest form it was embodied in William James, for it was in him refined by a genuine native culture. Now there is only one way in which such an individualism can be brought under constructive criticism, and that is by bringing the individual to state his ends and purposes in terms of the social means he is using. You cannot get at him with an ethics from above; you *can* reach him by an ethics that is simply the development of the intelligence implicit in his act. I take it that it is such an implicit intelligence that is responsible for the steady development and social integration that has taken place in the American community, with little leadership and almost entirely without ideas. It is hardly necessary to point out that John Dewey's philosophy, with its insistence upon the statement of the end in terms of the means, is the developed method of that implicit intelligence in the mind of the American community. And there is no other test of the intelligence of your moral and intellectual hypotheses except that they work. In the profoundest sense John Dewey is the philosopher of America.

THE PROSPECT FOR EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER
Professor of Religion, Columbia University

SAMUEL JOHNSON, the first president of King's College and one of the first American philosophers, said philosophy should be considered "not as a system of curious and idle speculations, but as a practical principle of discipline firmly possessing the heart and incessantly exerting itself in the life."*

I cite this instance of the empirical conception of philosophy not in order to remind you that Professor Dewey is not its first champion, for then I should have gone back at least as far as Confucius, but in order to prove that Dewey's philosophy is one of the natural ends or culminations of Columbia University. For in celebrating the seventieth birthday of Professor Dewey, our University is also celebrating the realization of one of its earliest aims, namely, the desire that philosophy might be established as a "practical principle of discipline firmly possessing the heart and incessantly exerting itself in the life." Professor Dewey's history, to use his

* *Samuel Johnson: His Career and Writings*, Vol. I, p. 118.

own terms, is linked to that of Columbia, not only by the course of events, but by their empirical meanings; and though Chicago may well boast of its instrumental function in producing Dewey's philosophy, Columbia may claim the privilege of being by nature entitled to the consummatory enjoyments.

But I have a more serious purpose in calling your attention to these words of Samuel Johnson, for they illustrate what I shall call a certain elusiveness in empirical philosophy. If any one today were to read Johnson's philosophy, he would find it almost entirely a "system of curious and idle speculations," though in his day it was full of life. Its living quality cannot now be recovered by scrutinizing its subject-matter, but only by imaginatively reëntering its intellectual and social environment. Thus every philosophy is or was empirical, at least to its author, and any conceivable subject-matter may be the life-blood of a living philosophy. No philosopher doubts this empirical, living quality in his own system, but few sense it in others, and still fewer are fortunate enough to see their ideas living in other minds; for to others they usually seem a mass of cold distinctions and clever arguments, which may evoke their admiration but seldom move their minds.

The empirical or non-empirical quality of philosophy is, therefore, not intrinsic but circumstantial; it is relative to certain times and persons and relevant

to certain issues. And if we would observe it, we must study not the philosophy's anatomy, but its behavior. Philosophies seldom "work themselves out to their logical conclusions," as the phrase goes; they are molded by circumstance and finally perish as if by accident. They readily "become vermiculate and putrify," as Francis Bacon said. But they also revive on occasion after years of entombment. This life career of an idea or system of ideas is only remotely related to its logical structure, and resembles rather the complicated contingencies which beset other living beings; but it is precisely this elusive vitality that is the measure of its empirical meaning.

And it is from this point of view that I wish to consider the philosophy of John Dewey, a philosophy which is now no longer his private possession, but rather one of the public's problems. Its intellectual anatomy is familiar to us all; and to many of us, whose nourishment it has been, it is almost too intimate to be known; it is immediately enjoyed and suffered. Therefore I shall not argue the question of its truth or falsity, nor do I raise the question of its inner harmony and outer versatility. I speak rather of its career in human experience. Already time has told on it, and no doubt Professor Dewey, himself, now detects "curious and idle speculations," which once were packed with significance. These shifts in significance are so unpredictable and em-

pirical meanings are so elusive that prophecy in this field seems rank presumption. Nevertheless I shall venture a look ahead; and if I fail to foretell the actual future, I shall at least have the satisfaction of having portrayed a possible one.

Let me begin with some of the commonplaces of the schoolroom, and point out that the term Dewey is used for two quite distinct objects: there is the academic Dewey, whose pragmatic meaning is books to be studied, and the public Dewey, whose pragmatic meaning is books to be read. Academically Dewey is little short of a revolution, whose consequences are just beginning to be seen. For it stands to reason that the thousands of American students who are studying Dewey are not studying something which they otherwise would. There was a time in American education when students were allowed to lay aside Locke's *Essay* and study instead the latest works of "Professor Kant." Then Professor Kant was sacrificed to Professor Hegel; Comte was sacrificed to Spencer and both to McCosh; and so forth. I mean to call attention not so much to the mere fact that philosophic schools change and with them their textbooks, as to the more significant fact that the next generation never knows just why the change was made. The next generation did not see Kant against a background of Locke, nor McCosh against Comte and Spencer. In the same way stu-

dents today are reading the books which Professor Dewey has written and not the books he has read. No doubt this is progress in itself, but apart from the question of better or worse, it is a significant change. I am not suggesting that one must read Lotze, Green, and Bradley, in order to understand Dewey; but I do suggest that it makes a great difference in the meaning whether one reads these *and* Dewey, or just Dewey, or Dewey *and*, say, Freud, Russell, and Aldous Huxley. The philosophic experience which is now being brought to Dewey's philosophy is quite different from that out of which it grew. Many of Dewey's finest pages are devoted to the critical analysis and reinterpretation of the classic figures in the history of philosophy. But to those who have no classical education, just so much of the meaning of Dewey's works is lost. In this way the discovery of each new classic tends to sweep the educational decks clean and signifies a fresh start with new subject-matters and new techniques. Academic education is seldom what Dewey's theory demands and what his own practice exhibits, a reinterpretation of tradition in terms of today's experience; for today's experience is itself transformed into a tradition. Hence these modern school-children, now coming of age, are necessarily giving this philosophy new perspectives and emphases. They do not become empirical, as Dewey did, by dint of

hard, dialectical labor; they begin as empiricists, learning their empiricist textbooks. Such an academic exploitation of empirical philosophy will no doubt create many who can cry "experience, experience," but who have never entered empirical method by the straight and narrow gate.

But even in academic circles empirical philosophy is not hopeless. Precisely because we no longer read the old texts, few of us are aware of the enormous change which has come over students of philosophy since the James-Dewey leaven began to work. If we should dig into the dusty library shelves and open the typical texts of the *ancien régime*, Samuel Johnson, Stewart, Wayland, Bain, Noah Porter, McCosh, not to mention the dangerously recent ones, we would be impressed immediately with the change of atmosphere. Then the fundamentals were safe and sure, and the rivalry of the schools was little more than a competition in exposition. It was strictly a professors' game. Now, there is genuine doubt and uncertainty in the air and even the polemics reflect a spirit of inquiry. Ancient authorities are blasphemed, the former obvious truths of reason are irreverently denied, and the commonest facts of experience are so variously interpreted that one hardly dares mention them for fear of being contradicted both by one's neighbor and by one's own next observations. This atmos-

phere of doubt and confusion is troublesome to many who were reared in the neat and orderly systems of yesterday; but the new generation is accepting it genially and with ease. Royce could count on a sincere scepticism and pessimism arising out of his "strife of systems," and James could move his audience to tears by picturing the impending tragedy of the material cosmos, but such effects are with difficulty achieved today. Students of philosophy expect to find kaleidoscopic entertainment rather than intellectual security. No doubt much of this is little more than a passing mode of light-heartedness, but there is in it also an underlying realistic and naturalistic attitude which is a genuine creation and which will endure for more than a philosophic season. There is a genuine loosening up of systems and a more willing attention to specific problems and concrete situations. Professors of philosophy, in other words, are less given to the ingenious exposition of total systems and are becoming scientific specialists in some technical field of research. Greek philosophy, that ancient mother of all the sciences, has finally died in childbirth, and each of her children is going its own way. Each science has its own apparatus and speaks its own language, until the world of scholars resembles, as President Butler has said, a new Tower of Babel. The old systematic dogmatism is giving place to independent sciences

and, as a consequence, academic philosophy is rapidly becoming a lost art. The profession is disintegrating.

I turn now from the achievements of Professor Dewey to the real Dewey, or rather, I turn from those students who conscientiously peck at his books to that larger audience which is interested in catching something of his spirit. What forms is the empirical temper assuming here? I think, first of all, we may note a more scientific attitude toward science. Philosophers have always used science as a storehouse for doctrines. "Science teaches us" is the well-worn formula. Such a use of science is *ipso facto* a confession that the philosopher who uses it is still a stranger to the scientific mind. Philosophers who have the habit of rummaging in science for useful bits of doctrine are really engaging in the cheapest kind of second-hand business. Science teaches such persons anything they please, except to be scientific. For them science is merely a colorless substitute for biblical texts. Preachers, on becoming philosophers, change their intellectual clothes sooner than their habits. What has ruined this theological exploitation of science is not so much the ridiculous and parasitical appearance of the philosophies erected out of such stuff, as certain extraneous factors. The publishers and advertisers have done most of it. They have held up so many

"final solutions to ultimate problems," so many "last words of science," and so many "authorities in the field" to a supposedly gullible public, that the game is up. A new gospel every month is no gospel at all, and thus the reader has been physically forced to dispense with the luxury of scientific finality and has become accustomed to the ever-shifting scene of scientific discovery.

The scientists, themselves, have also ruined the game. There was a time when a scientist felt honored to be cited by a philosopher; today such an event is awaited with fear and trembling. The philosophies which are based on the latest science have become such a nuisance to scientists that they have adopted defensive measures. They have lost their *naïveté* and are forsaking their one-time objects in order to introspect on their methods. They have themselves learned all the philosophers' tricks in trade, and are rapidly engrossing the business. The philosophy of science, in other words, is now being conducted largely by scientists or ex-scientists themselves. They have discovered the joys of epistemological puzzles and are easily outdoing the less technically trained philosophers. For the time being, this means a marked revival of interest in the problem of knowledge, under the guise of the science of the foundations of science, or of the mathematical symbols of reason, or the theory of

events, vibrations, monads, and quanta. All this is an admirable philosophic toy for scientists and proves now and then to be scientifically useful, but it scarcely serves those who want a "practical principle of discipline firmly possessing the heart and incessantly exerting itself in the life." A genuinely empirical philosophy can be scientific, therefore, not in the sense that it is based on the philosophy of science, nor on the authority of science, but on an imitation of scientists in practice. Here, I believe, John Dewey may well be cited as a model. I know that there are many references in Dewey's writings to contemporary scientists, but they are usually made, not for the purpose of citing authorities, but for the purpose of illustrating method. When he needs a science, he makes his own. When he needed information on how we think, he got it directly; when he wanted a scientific ethics, he constructed one out of first-hand materials; when he formulated a philosophy of law, he studied the law itself. Such homemade science may appear somewhat primitive to our younger professional practitioners with their factory equipment, but it is at least genuine and honest. This empirical attitude towards science means, in other words, a conscientious employment of beliefs in view of the experience from which they were derived and the universe of discourse to which they are germane. When

such habits are once established, the agony of the problem of knowledge may well take a secondary place in empirical philosophy; for nothing is more detrimental to the current intellectual atmosphere than the introspective self-consciousness with which the sciences (and especially the social sciences) are at present afflicted.

From the metaphysical angle as well, the philosophy of science has recently instilled new life into the problem of knowledge. For by this time it is evident that the philosophy typified by such scientists as Eddington has created a situation which is strongly reminiscent of Kant. There are many today who imagine themselves awakened from their dogmatic slumber by the discovery that science moves in a world of abstraction, encased by its own instruments, living on pointers and figures, estranged from things-in-themselves, and never coming to grips with reality. Once more the world of natural science is unintelligible to itself and cries for metaphysical prolegomena; and once more mysticism, the fashionable term for God, freedom, and immortality, is proffered to those who hunger and thirst for immediate knowledge. The barrier which has thus been reërected between science and nature or between knowledge and its objects constitutes a fresh challenge to an empirical philosophy which relies on natural continuity. Therefore Dewey's

attempt to describe the natural basis and human occasions of science has a new significance; and though the terminology of the controversy has changed almost beyond recognition, his Darwinian naturalism is still face-to-face with Spencer's unknowable.

But whatever be the fortunes of the theory of knowledge, the theory of art and criticism will probably receive decided emphasis, for there can be no doubt that the progress of the arts is at present intimately linked to the problems of evaluation and criticism. Professor Dewey's emphasis on art in *Experience and Nature* and his conception of philosophy as the criticism of criticism is not only evidence of the growing vitality of this problem, but it is a direct challenge to current thought on this subject. The idea that philosophy is a critique is, of course, a commonplace since Kant, but what makes the Deweyan conception significant is that criticism is here regarded as a more general term than science and is clearly distinguished from it. The habit persists of regarding morality, religion, politics and the other arts ultimately as forms of knowledge. The terms "moral knowledge," "esthetic knowledge," "religious truth," and other similar expressions, are, to be sure, not so prevalent as they once were; but the idea which they express remains generally dominant. Much ingenuity is still expended in trying to reduce the arts to avenues of knowledge.

It seems not enough that the arts should be intelligent and intelligible, they must somehow be intellect itself, searching for truth and giving embodiment to reason. For it is generally believed that there can be no objective criticism of the arts unless they are modelled on logical patterns to which the criteria of truth and error can be applied. Hence the would-be "*sciences*" of ethics, theology, politics and esthetics are kept pure by doing violence to their subject-matters. Dewey's attempt to invert this whole procedure and his theory of science as but a specialized form of criticism, and of knowledge as a particular kind of art, gives an application to his philosophy which is today peculiarly vital and significant. It emphasizes the close relationship between philosophy and the imaginative arts; it applies to philosophy the general discipline of technology rather than the specialized canons of scientific proof, and it demands the discovery of criteria taken from all the arts rather than from the natural sciences alone. It inquires into the meaning rather than into the validity of a philosophy. Furthermore it plunges philosophy into the thick of the realm of particulars, for Dewey's philosophy does not fall into the facile and conventional mode of providing the arts with universal aims and forms, in order to make them more amenable to reason. It accepts them in all their particularity and recognizes a radical irrationality in

reality. This willingness to take the particular qualities and primary forms of experience at their face value, this willingness to operate in a universe which tolerates intelligence, but is not itself modelled on some rational pattern, makes philosophy one with the fine arts. It sacrifices certainty and precision to practical skill and empirical relevance. It means literally that a good philosopher must be a man of much practical experience, a doctrine which has always been unpopular among the young and incredible to the learned. If this is philosophy, few professors of philosophy will be experts; if this is philosophy, it can only be taught in the school of experience. Traditionally philosophy has relied on technical short-cuts. It has invented transcendental shelters for adroit professionals, whither they might flee from the troublesome problems which continually baffle the wits of laymen, and preached a particular way of life and a particular set of values as alone worthy of a reasonable being. To renounce this privilege, to cease "patronizing nature" and "looking with condescension upon existence" is indeed a bitter prescription for an ancient and honorable order, but it is inevitable for any philosopher who wishes to be honestly and radically empirical.

The first step in this direction and one to which Dewey's philosophy has made important contributions, is the task of psycho-analyzing beliefs, so to

speak, of discovering why men believe what they do — and, first of all, why philosophers believe what they do. Our knowledge of the factors which govern the credibility of beliefs is still in its infancy. Philosophizing is still a surprisingly naïve performance; philosophers are in the habit of imagining that they believe what is true because it is true and that those who differ from them are simply more superficial. It is idle to estimate a philosophy, or any other set of opinions, without knowing in detail how it is motivated, what it means concretely to the person holding it, and why it seems more reasonable to him than some other belief. The history of philosophy is a fertile field for such inquiries, as Professor Dewey's writings prove. But what is even more important from the empirical point of view is the application of such research to beliefs actually held today. For in spite of philosophy's supposed concern with beliefs, the reader of modern philosophy must get the impression that man is primarily a *perceiving* mechanism. It is strange how philosophy has been so hypnotized by the psychology of perception, and that belief, which is evidently a primary mode of experience, has been twisted almost beyond recognition. Dewey's attempt to wean philosophy from this preoccupation with perception and to consider directly the operation of beliefs in experience is undoubtedly a prom-

ising program, and its implications are far-reaching. It will tend to disengage philosophy from its alliance with academic psychology and physiology and to carry it over into the fields of psychoanalysis, of anthropology, of the study of symbolism, and, in general, of the sciences which deal with man's social behavior and institutions. There can be little doubt that Dewey's own thinking has been moving in this direction, but there can also be little doubt that his movement in this direction is carrying him away from the great majority of his academic colleagues. For, to repeat, his conception of philosophy is not based on the teaching of philosophy, but on philosophical living. It is neither necessary nor probable that this sort of philosophy be professionalized and seated on academic chairs. Philosophers go by many names and are found in strange places. Therefore, I take it, Dewey is not pleading for a revolution among professors of philosophy, but he is interpreting the practical ideal of every one who with Socrates believes that "an unexamined life is not worth living."

I have thought it my duty on this occasion to dispose of these generalities as quickly as I could and to spend the remainder of my time in making some concrete application of empirical method, lest I should seem unwilling to practise what I preach.

And, since empiricism is essentially impertinent, it has occurred to me that there could be no more fitting theme than the attempt to psycho-analyze some of Dewey's beliefs — of course, within the limits of reason and the proprieties of a public occasion. Why does Dewey believe what he does? That he should be amenable to reason may not present a serious problem, especially in view of the fact that he was raised in a good Christian home; but his sensitiveness to all those qualities of experience which usually elude philosophers, needs to be explained. To get any light on this subject, I was naturally forced to examine his childhood environment, hoping to discover in his early life in Vermont some of the forces and complexes which set his mind on its eventful career. And in this undertaking I have been not wholly disappointed. For while rummaging among the folkways and traditions of the natives, I ran onto an odd tale, which in all probability has a direct bearing on our problem. But even if it fails to illumine what I have tried to say, it may at least remind us that this is a celebration and not a symposium.

They say that when ancient Greece was destroyed, the gods of Mt. Olympus were forced to wander far and near in search of a new and happier home. Among them, the Great God Pan, after some centuries of adventure, chanced to land on the summit of the Green Mountains of Vermont. The highest

peak of this range has a curious shape. It is supposed to resemble a face turned skyward, but, like Vermont faces, its two prominent features are the nose and the chin. It so happened that Pan landed on the Nose. One day while he was walking along the ridge he saw a stranger who appeared to be sufficiently inhuman to be divine and sufficiently awkward to be unknown to Pan. As they approached each other, Pan introduced himself and inquired the stranger's name.

"I am called the Logos," he replied.

"The name sounds familiar," said Pan. "And where do you live?"

"On the Chin."

"But," said Pan, "would you not be more comfortable on the Forehead? Come with me onto the Nose where we can look down upon it."

"I know the Forehead well," said the Logos, "but it is too low and scraggly, in the first place, and in the second, I am told by specialists that the Chin is now my proper habitation. Therefore I have adapted myself as best I could to these surroundings, and am really as comfortable as an exile can be."

The two gods soon became good friends and frequently exchanged visits. On the Nose, where Pan dwelt and which faces west, they would feast their senses on a colorful scene. They would look down upon the wide fertile plain, a mosaic of mellow fields,

lined by dark green hedges and dotted by red barns. Here and there houses and trees clustered around a white spire; the roads wound in and out, converging on the city of Burlington. From north to south stretched Lake Champlain like a bright highway, with its burden of boats suggesting the busy life of commerce which it served, and the invasions of war which it once suffered. Beyond were the fantastic peaks of the Adirondacks. At twilight, which was their favorite hour on the Nose, the brilliant hues of the sunset over lake and mountains gradually gave way to the lights of towns and farmhouses, which sprinkled the plain as if they were the earthly counterparts of the stars. The constantly changing colors and outlines of this landscape, the busy life which it suggested and the rural civilization which it nourished, were an endless joy to the gods, especially to Pan, who called it *his* world.

The Logos thought this world a bit too carnal and claimed to prefer more reflective pleasures. On the Chin, therefore, they faced northeast and looked upon a quite different scene. As far as they could see, there was range upon range of symmetrical mountains, in orderly succession, each with its wave-like chain of foothills sloping regularly away in opposite directions. The Logos did not think of them as the Green Mountains, but preferred to regard them as frozen vibratory events crystallized by the

glaciers from time into space. Fog frequently hid the valleys. Consequently their chief delight was in the heavenly bodies. They would await the rising of sun or moon, trace their even orbits across the sky, and contemplate the rhythmic movements of the cosmos. Hour after hour the Logos would expound the beauties of this eternal order and Pan would only half understand; but he could not help feeling the alternate waves of exaltation and humility which this world produces, even in the gods.

Being gods, these two never quarreled about whose was the *real* world; each politely took the other's for granted as well as his own; and both shared innocently each other's points of vantage. From the Chin they always contemplated the world of reason and eternal order and from the Nose they always bathed unreflectively in essences.

One day, however, Pan complained to the Logos that their mountain was obviously imperfect. The Logos himself admitted that it took three gods to make a heaven and Pan wanted at least seven before he would be willing to stay much longer. A few more gods, he thought, and Mt. Olympus might be reincarnated. Accordingly they walked farther than usual that day in the hope of chancing upon some other gods who might be near unknown to them. But before they knew it, they were well down the mountain side and Pan, ever ready for novelty,

suggested that they continue down into the valley.

"I won't descend into *your* valley," retorted the Logos, "and I'm not so sure that I for one ought to descend at all. It's no fit place for a rational god."

"It may be *your* valley into which we are headed for all I know," replied Pan. "In any case I don't intend to stay down there myself; I am merely curious to see what it looks like."

" If you want to *see,*" the Logos insisted, "by all means go back to the mountain top. Going down into the valley to *see,* is like putting out the light to see what is in the dark."

"But things look different from different points of view," said Pan.

"To be sure; but the more you spin around from one point of view to another, the less you can see anything straight. What better point of view is there than the mountain?"

Pan could not keep up with this argument, but in the meantime they had unconsciously gone so far into the woods that it made little difference in what direction they walked; all paths were equally blind. In this situation the Logos was completely helpless and Pan went wherever the going was easiest. The Logos wanted to sit down and think, but Pan said thinking was better on foot, since the woods were damp and cool. So they wandered, half feeling, half arguing their way.

Finally Pan admitted with a puzzled look, "Well, this certainly can't be *my* world into which we've strayed. Mine is not so full of brambles and brush."

"It's the difference in point of view," sneered the Logos.

"No, it isn't; you can see for yourself, if you have any memory at all, that we never saw anything like this from the mountain."

"I told you so," said the Logos. "This is a different world entirely, a world in which we have no business at all. It takes a lower form of life to live in such a world."

"We can *live* in it, only we don't know where we're at," argued Pan.

This was too low a subterfuge for the Logos and he walked on without even taking notice of it. Thus they continued. They would walk in silence for a while, until fear prompted them to argue. The fits of argument became more and more heated, and they would probably have quarreled openly and separated, had they not suddenly stumbled upon a path which led into the clearing and then onto the highway. Pan distrusted the highway, for it was closed in by trees and hedges and forced him to go straight ahead without being able to see more than he could in the woods; but the Logos was visibly more at ease, for he soon figured it out that the highway was evidently designed by nature for travel and hence must

lead *some*where and therefore they were no longer lost.

After a while they came to a farmhouse and both agreed to stop and make inquiries. As they approached the house, the farmer came out to meet them and before they had a chance to frame a question, he yelled: "Are ye lost?"

"Yes," blurted out Pan, whereupon the Logos hastily but faithfully added: "Not yet."

"Well, go around to the porch on the east side of the house and set a while till we can find somethin' to eat."

Pan followed the farmer's gesture. The Logos hesitated, partly because he wanted to figure out which was east, partly because he thought food no adequate solution to their difficulties. But the farmer's voice had so restored Pan that he grasped the Logos by the hand and fairly pulled him around the house.

They had no sooner settled into their porch rockers than they looked at each other in amazement. For there, directly facing them, was a huge Nose and Chin, outlined clearly against the sky and glowing in the sunset.

Pan shouted before even the Logos had time to think: "It's *my* valley after all." The Logos, however, showed no signs of enthusiasm. "To think," he finally mused, "that I might have seen *your* valley

all the time from the other side of *my* Chin. There is something wrong, for our two worlds are all mixed up down here. Nothing is clear and distinct down here except that big Nose and Chin up there. Let's get away as soon as possible."

"On the contrary," replied Pan, "we are already beginning to learn. We never understood our own Nose and Chin until now. It's all much clearer to me now that I can look back to my own point of view. If only I could see my valley from my position here!"

"That's it," the Logos continued, "your whole experience is gone. You don't know where you are. That may not be *your* Nose at all. There may be many of them. In fact, there are so many possibilities, now that I stop to think, that I can prove absolutely to you that in a place like this you never could know anything."

"You might prove it," said Pan with a smile, "but not to me."

"Too true," the Logos admitted. "Where innocence is consummatory, 'tis folly to have reflective experience. Nevertheless you will admit that this is no proper place for gods."

"Well, what of it?" argued Pan. "Suppose we *are* here by accident and don't belong here? You're afraid; that's the trouble. If you could only get over the fear that created you and forget some of

your divine taboos, you might stay here a while and learn something."

"I wouldn't be afraid, either," said the Logos, "if I were as innocent as you; but they might make a farmer out of me or use me even worse."

"Don't worry," said Pan, "it will be a long while before they can use you for anything, and we'll manage to escape back onto the mountain before it gets dangerous."

"That's easier said than done. It was bad enough getting into this world; how do you imagine we'll ever find our way out."

"I confess I never thought of that," said Pan.

"Just what I knew all the time. You're not a bit anxious to get back."

The Logos was becoming more and more uneasy, and when the farmer opened the screen door behind him, he jumped up and off the porch and started running down the road in full retreat. Pan could do nothing but run after him, leaving the farmer to his empty rocking chairs and his belief in ghosts. The Logos said to Pan, when they were safely down the road, that he intended to go to the nearest town for a guide book, compass, and map, and he was not amazed when Pan told him that such things had no commercial value here and hence did not exist, for this only strengthened his conviction that he was lost in an irrational world.

"Now, there is only one thing for us to do," argued Pan. "It's dangerous for either one of us to lose the other, since neither could ever find his way back alone."

"Nor the two of us together, *alone*," added the Logos. "We'll do nothing but quarrel until we get back to our mountain tops and our own separate worlds. Oh, I wish I were home."

"Consequently," said Pan, appearing to be reasoning, "we must make some sort of bargain, contract, and agreement. I'll stay by you and keep you from harm, if you'll stay by me and help me learn how to get back up."

"Help *you* learn; that's not a bargain, that's a gamble."

"Very well, a gamble, then. What else can we do?"

"What we need," said the Logos in a more serious tone, "is a third party. Two of anything is always a dualism. We always had three at home; let's try three down here for luck, if we *must* gamble."

"That's what I've been thinking," said Pan. "Let's educate a guide."

"Indeed," sneered the Logos, " 'educate a guide.' That is known in heaven as a self-evident contradiction and patent absurdity! Honestly, Pan, I'm ashamed of you. How do you expect me to 'help you learn,' as you modestly put it?"

"Nevertheless, I have an idea," said Pan. "Now listen to it and if you get a better one, so much the better. Let us haunt some one for a few years. You can haunt as well as I can. We'll make friends with some country lad. We can tell him all about the beauties of our mountain vistas and he can teach us the ways of this lower world. You can teach him all about the cosmos and I'll show him all the primary values. After a few years, the boy will certainly feel a strong desire to climb the mountain. We can then join him, and the three of us may find our way up."

"You don't know human nature if you think a boy will be enticed by our mountain visions."

"What?" cried Pan, "Is even the Logos a sceptic? Or are you getting over your homesickness?"

"Don't be silly," said the Logos, "who ever heard of a god having faith in a man? Besides, we two can't make anything out of a boy but a divided personality."

"You're quite right," admitted Pan, "we can not trust men, once we get to town. I could make friends with farmers, but in the city, as soon as a god is discovered, he is worshipped. Mark my word, when we get to Burlington, the whole population will soon be divided into Logites, Panists, Logpanists and Panlogites. They are not satisfied until they have exhausted all the possibilities of cultic contortions — or, as they say, all possible standpoints."

"Well," suggested the Logos, "couldn't we avoid these standpoints, if we went incognito?"

"Impossible," said Pan, "for if we don't make ourselves known at all, nothing will happen; and if we disguise ourselves, we shall merely be given different names. They will worship us under any name. A god has little chance of escape here in New England; the people are taught from childhood to be on the lookout for them. Our only hope, and I admit it is a dim one, is to find some new-born infant who still has pure experience. We must get inside some soul before it becomes self-conscious. And we must manage to stay on such intimate terms with it, that it will never suspect us of being independent objects. If we could find some such pure infant soul and keep it innocent, we might educate it from the inside, so to speak, and then we would have a guide; but if we should ever be detected as external objects, we would be doomed to being worshipped."

"I don't relish this business of hiding behind somebody's pure experience," said the Logos. "I think I'd rather be worshipped."

"I feared as much. I shall not be at all surprised if you fall before the temptations of city life. But, if you do, you can shift for yourself. I'll run off and play with the farmers, and we shall both end where we began."

The threat of being abandoned reduced the Logos

to submission and he finally agreed to Pan's plan. "I'll join you in the baby-haunting expedition, if I must," he said, "but I fear it will be the ruin of two perfectly good gods."

"It may be," said Pan, "but it may also be the making of a very wise and decent human being."

And they arrived in Burlington on October 20, 1859.

THE LUNCHEON MEETING

Hotel Astor

THE luncheon meeting sponsored by the National Committee to Honor John Dewey, held at the Hotel Astor, New York City, on Saturday, October 19, 1929, was called to order at 2:45 P.M.

Mrs. Joseph R. Swan: Professor Dewey, and Friends: On behalf of the committee formed to celebrate and do honor to Professor Dewey on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, we would welcome this amazing group of his friends and admirers, with the knowledge that many not able to be here in person, multitudes in fact, are with us in spirit.

We have come together today for the purpose of trying to express to you, Professor Dewey, the awareness of your contemporaries of the great contribution, the enlightened influence of your thought on the social progress of this time.

We would remind you that you have said that words can only hint, point to awareness of meanings. Therefore, even the words of our eloquent speakers we would say we know to be inadequate, and quite humbly we would like to acknowledge the fact — the results of your teachings — that we re-

alize that only in so far as our habits and our actions bear witness to our enlightenment, are we indeed under the influence of Professor Dewey.

It is very fitting therefore that for our Chairman today we should have a man whose accomplishment bespeaks his enlightenment. As President of Yale University he has made that institution what Professor Dewey says education should be — an instrument for realizing the higher hopes of man.

I have the honor to present to you President Angell.

JAMES R. ANGELL, President of Yale University: *Mrs. Swan, Dr. Dewey, Ladies and Gentlemen:* I count it a very great honor, as I am sure you all must do, to be permitted to share in this extraordinary outpouring of appreciation for the great career of the gentleman who is the honored guest on this occasion. Forty-three years ago I had the privilege of sitting at his feet in a college classroom; and in a very true sense, I have been sitting there ever since.

I can recall in the history of American life no parallel for this distinguished gathering which is here today, for what it expresses of grateful appreciation of a great personality and a great contribution to our national life, unless one should go back to the days of Benjamin Franklin and to the occasion of his triumphal return from the Continent and par-

ticularly from Paris, where he had left the impress of his powerful mind upon all the contemporary thinking of his day.

Professor Dewey might perhaps claim the authority of the psalmist who at one time drew attention to the consequences of passing three score years and ten, but so far from being ready to retire, he is really only just getting his second wind. And we are treating him today, at least so we hope, not as the Athenians treated Socrates. Certainly we trust that the very luxurious meal with which we have just been supplied will not have upon him any effect suggestive of the hemlock. We also trust that unlike Voltaire he will not feel that the words which have already been addressed to him and those which during the afternoon I am sure are still to be addressed, will in any sense involve smothering him with roses.

We desire that if we cannot add to his honor — and I doubt whether in any true sense we can — he should feel, as he only can in the presence of a great assembly of this character, the depth and sincerity of the respect and affection in which he is held.

This gathering is but a symbol of a very much wider and larger outpouring of public feeling and sentiment, and I have in my hand, and I have asked permission to read, two from a great mass of messages coming from literally all over the world indi-

cating the manner in which Dr. Dewey has left his impress on foreign peoples as well as upon our own, and disclosing how deeply they sense the contribution which he has made and how completely they desire to be identified with us in this expression of affection.

A sentence or two from a letter from Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court. After a more purely personal message he concludes: "But I would not miss the opportunity to express the profound respect for Professor Dewey that I have drawn from his writings. It seems to me that his insight into the movement of the universe as it shows itself to men goes to as high a point as has ever been reached by articulate speech."

And a message on behalf of the Quo Ming in China. "I am directed by the Quo Ming Agency of China to convey to you heartiest congratulations on the occasion of your seventieth birthday and to express on behalf of the journalistic elements of China their profound appreciation of the invaluable contribution you have made both personally during your visit to our country and through your pen, to the advancement of Chinese thought along enlightened, modern lines. We welcome this opportunity to pay a tribute of respect and affection to you who have done so much to level racial and other artificial barriers to the end there may exist among

the peoples of the earth peace based upon intelligent good will, sympathy and understanding."

Your Committee has been very discriminating in inviting two very distinguished persons to come and speak for us, to voice the thoughts which we should have liked to voice and to represent us on this occasion.

Accordingly, I have great pleasure in calling, first, upon a distinguished American woman whom I had the pleasure of meeting a year or two after she had gone to Hull House to take up that long and distinguished career of fighting for the under dog which has made her known literally all over the world, known for her penetrating intelligence, her deep wisdom, her unfailing sympathy with every human ill — often called, and I think justly — the American Joan of Arc. I have great pleasure in presenting Miss Addams of Chicago.

JOHN DEWEY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

By Jane Addams
Head Resident, Hull House, Chicago

Mr. Toastmaster, Dr. Dewey, Ladies and Gentlemen: I am going to break all precedents and read, which is a horrid thing to do. But I am afraid of all these philosophers.

John Dewey was a member of the first board of Hull-House Trustees. It consisted of two or three business men, two or three philanthropic women, and the philosopher to keep us from becoming either hard-boiled or sentimental in this new undertaking, which the English somewhat heavily called "residential study of the problems of poverty." Unlike many trustees, he actually worked on the job; he took Julia Lathrop's Plato Club for a series of Sunday afternoons one midwinter, some days so stormy that only the "cranks" came. Perhaps Dr. Dewey would be interested even now to hear of those uncompromising men, although death has at last secured them all — one of them only six weeks ago, the most implacable of anarchists, died in a Western town where he was a member of the school board and therefore received a municipal funeral — a fate

his hardiest enemy would not have dared to suggest to him. The leading single-taxer of the Club ten years ago sent me from his hospital bed a copy of *The Ancient Lowly* in which are recorded the wrongs of oppressed men, from the pyramid-building slaves down. He begged me to take it from a dying man; that unearned increment had been at the bottom of it all; Dr. Dewey may recall that convinced Socialist whose dogmatism never allowed him under any circumstance to agree with anybody else, but who occasionally shouted out triumphantly that the lecturer was agreeing with him. The Plato Club was an epitome of all discussions held on social questions in the nineties. You propounded your theory and stuck to it through thick and thin, and no compromise was permitted! You either believed in heredity or you believed in environment, and even the high schools debated the question with the same fervor brought to bear upon the problem of the priority of the chicken or the egg.

It was therefore most significant when John Dewey, who came to the new University in 1894, announced the theory, or rather when the theory slowly leaked out, of an ever-changing society in constant need of exploration and rediscovery; and when he applied a new test to social schemes, the test of their ultimate social utility. This strange doctrine finally reached the comic strips in the daily

papers. Mr. Dooley said to Mr. Hennesy in the *Chicago Tribune* itself, — "The question, Hennesy, is, does it work? The jawing isn't worth a tinker's dam." Dam is not a swear word used in this connection but the name of an old English coin although I am not quite sure whether or not Mr. Dooley knew this!

It was all the more useful then — it even became a popular experiment when John Dewey opened a little practice school which he established near the University of Chicago, and demonstrated among other things the interaction between the individual and his environment. He studied each child, not in a static environment but in various surroundings largely produced by the child himself. An historic period having made itself at home in the child's imagination, he energetically dug, built, wove, and cooked according to his need in a primitive hut or a castle moat.

John Dewey's little yellow covered book, *The School and Society* made so clear the necessity for individualizing each child that it is quite fair, I think, to say that his insistence upon an atmosphere of freedom and confidence between the teacher and pupil, of a common interest in the life they led together, profoundly affected all similar relations, certainly those between the social worker and his client. We were used to saying that the welfare of

the community is a public responsibility dependent upon mutual effort. In fact, it was one of our catch phrases, but John Dewey told us that the general intelligence is dormant with its communications broken and faint until it possesses the public as its medium.

He who had so highly individualized the children in his school as to drive timid parents into alarmed protest, warned us not to make exceptions of ourselves in regard to the experiences of life; but as he had socialized the children by giving them an almost empirical consciousness of the race life so he individualized us by the corollary that the public itself — for which we were so much concerned — came into existence only through the extension of the acts of individuals beyond those personally involved. Of course, we had many moments of depression. We sometimes recalled that John Dewey had said that it is not surprising that the application of scientific method to the matter closest to man — the social relationship — should have gone on more slowly than was expected, when we remembered that even such an apparently distant and indifferent region as the solar system could not be annexed to scientific inquiry, without arousing the opposing forces of the mightiest organizations of the day. One notable attempt even harvested a respectable crop of martyrs.

Perhaps the entire psychological approach to the problems of social welfare was implicit in the situation when that group of brilliant men formed the Department of Philosophy at the new University of Chicago. Most of them had been attached in some way to the University of Michigan; there were James Tufts, John Dewey, George Mead, James Angell, if I may be permitted to use the Quaker nomenclature. This philosophic department finally incorporated pedagogy within itself. Many educators had been philosophers and a few philosophers had been educators, but this department succeeded in breaking down those invisible walls which so stubbornly separate one academic department from another. There is nothing in all creation like it, excepting the unbreakable division between the different departments of the United States Government.

Perhaps we may trace back to this group of men the movement now culminating in the brand new psychiatric social worker and in the Institutes of Juvenile Research. It began in Chicago at least, when a student of John Dewey's was put in charge of the Child Study Department in the public schools. It was largely the prestige of Dr. Dewey himself which enabled the Department to come into existence; and perhaps it was not a mere coincidence that it was Chicago that founded the first Psychopathic Clinic attached to its Juvenile Court, which

in its turn had been the pioneer ten years earlier, because children were entitled to a court adapted to their own needs.

We are impatient for the time when such treatment may be extended to the adult criminal, for at the moment the data supplied by the psychologists are often left on the hands of the embarrassed judge as extra legal material; he cannot permit such evidence to affect his judicial decision, although it may be convincing enough to weigh heavily upon his conscience. One of this University of Chicago group, our chairman of today, is even now engaged in establishing an Institute of Human Relations, which we hope may in time release the inhibitions so curiously limiting our legal procedure.

Whatever may be the outcome of these newer experiments, many of John Dewey's contemporaries are certain of one thing; that the problems of social welfare in our own time have never been so squarely faced as by the philosopher who deliberately made the study of men and their intelligences a foundation for the study of the problems with which men have to deal. In those years when we were told by the scientists, or at least by the so-called scientists, that the world was in the grasp of sub-human forces against which it was absurd to oppose the human will, John Dewey calmly stated that the proper home of intelligence was the world itself and that the

true function of intelligence was to act as critic and regulator of the forces which move the world.

Perhaps the great tribute to this worldly wisdom of his — if I may be permitted a play upon the word — and the most impressive acknowledgment of his contribution to social welfare, have been the confidence with which one distracted nation after another has called him into their councils. We were in China only a few months after the Deweys had been there. The Philosophy Club at Peking, although staggering a little under the impact of a recent visit from Bertrand Russell, was voluble with admiration, insisting that the philosophy of Dewey and his concepts of conduct could be compared to no one but Confucius himself. It may have been this pious juxtaposition which moved one of these nascent philosophers gravely to remark, that it was a pity that when America needed a new religion that the citizens had not called upon John Dewey to found it — instead of Mrs. Eddy. Following the Dewey technique, Alice Dewey had inaugurated the office of Dean of Women at the National University of Nanking, to make clear that co-education was feasible in China as elsewhere. I shall always remember the tribute of affectionate appreciation given to her by her Chinese successor.

I do not know much personally of Dr. Dewey's journey to Turkey, although I have no doubt it was

as successful as his others were, but I do wish that I might reproduce to you the enthusiasm on the part of the young Mexicans; of Saenz, the present Minister of Education, of Vasconcelos who previously held that office, of the school of gifted artists who as they decorate the vast walls of the educational buildings with scenes from the history of the Aztecs and other Mexicans, always bear in mind the educational theory as they conceive John Dewey propounded it. They showed us a wall in a boys' school upon which the paintings had been deliberately defaced because they had violated the canons of the new education and had imitated the traditional frivolities of a dead and discredited art!

It is hard to exaggerate the gratitude of the young Russian intelligentsia in this country for the report that Dr. Dewey gave of the contemporary Russian experiment not only in education but in rebuilding the social structure itself. The representatives of a misunderstood and unpopular cause are devoted above all others to the recognized authority who becomes the champion of their cause through a clear and objective statement. He has done this many times. Years ago, before trade unions had proved their social utility and when it was scarcely respectable to be identified with them, John Dewey made it easier for them and for all their Chicago friends, although later he entered into a contest with

the Unions themselves that they might not curtail freedom in their educational enterprises.

That John Dewey should take an active part in the successful movement for the outlawry of war, is perhaps a corollary of his wide acquaintance with this world of ours and his desire for a stable foundation for those superstructures of social welfare of which we venture to dream.

Only once in a public crisis did I find my road taking a sharp right angle to the one he recommended. That fact in and of itself, gave me pause to think and almost threatened my confidence in the inevitability of that road. Our rough journeyings thereon often confirmed John Dewey's contention that unless truth vindicates itself in practice it easily slips into futile dogma, although advocates of peace in time of war were perforce thrust into the position of the doctrinaire. The Dewey teaching however saved us from resorting to the ineffable solace vouchsafed to the self-righteous; and as we struggled in one country after another, for a foothold in reality, we actually found enough of it, to justify the application of the Dewey method and were grateful to him for having taught it to us.

Of course even in the days when I first knew John Dewey he bore certain earmarks of the traditional absent-minded philosopher. I vividly remember when he lost a newly acquired Doctor's hood at the

fifty-years' celebration of the founding of the University of Wisconsin. Naturally a brilliant patch of red staining the campus was easily recovered, although it took some time to locate its owner. I recall that at the moment I was walking with the venerated President of the University of Michigan, down that path which seems to connect the sombre dome of the University with the gilded dome of the State House. Angell and Addams had "swapped" stories of foreign visitors whom we had entertained and we had almost reached a decision to collaborate on a book entitled *Famous People Whose Boots We Have Blacked*, for at that time distinguished foreigners — innocent of the domestic system prevailing on the broad and democratic prairies — confidingly flung their boots outside their bedroom doors, little suspecting that only their hosts would deign to pick them up. President Angell, whose diplomatic services had taken him well over the world, whose tolerant and kindly spirit had appraised many men of many lands, chuckled delightedly when asked if he had lost a hood, and replied — "Of course, it is Dewey's. The occasion wouldn't be complete unless he *had* lost it!" Turning to me, he remarked, "Dewey of all the men walking on this campus today, will probably go the farthest, in spite of the fact that they have combed the universities from Oxford down, for this occasion."

Although Dr. Dewey is not easy to read, nor, in the Chatauqua sense, is he a popular lecturer, through the conscious use of his luminous mind he has made over for thousands of people the connotations of the very word philosopher. This has been the result of his deliberate convictions. May we quote his own words which one of his students has placed on the title page of his latest book: "Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times, than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability. To try to escape from the snares and pitfalls of time by recourse to traditional problems and interests — rather than that, let the dead bury their own dead."

It is such winged words as these which have endeared John Dewey to those who live in Settlements or undertake other lines of social welfare.

I remember during certain strenuous days in Chicago when we were under cross fire in a bewildering situation of a strike turned into a lockout that I thought with a primitive green envy of university professors on the other side of town, secure from the bludgeonings of both trade unionists and capitalists. But at least one of these professors voluntarily came into the dust and confusion of the industrial arena as part of his lifelong effort to embody truth in conduct. He has qualified for a preëminent posi-

tion among all those committed to the long struggle for social betterment.

It is a toast rather than a topic — John Dewey and Social Welfare!

Chairman Angell: Miss Addams spoke with somewhat of an apologetic tone of bragging about Chicago and Chicago accomplishments. I think perhaps it would put her at her ease if I repeated a story which came from her neighbor on the other side during the luncheon and which relates to the great patriotic citizen who rules over the destinies of Chicago as Mayor.

It is alleged that one of his colleagues said to him, "Mr. Mayor, which of these Georges is it that you are so down on, George III or George V?" To which his Honor replied, "Gosh! There ain't two of them guys is there?"

Of course I wouldn't wish you to assume from that ill-natured story that the progress of social betterment in Chicago has been checked at all since Mr. Dewey's retirement from that city.

The next speaker, like Miss Addams, comes from the great prairies of Illinois. He was born near the home of the Great Emancipator and perhaps gathered from that circumstance something of his impatience with sham and his sympathy with the oppressed. At all events, he has succeeded in estab-

lishing a type of historical writing which has been quite revolutionary in its effect, at least upon his readers, and unlike most historians, he has had abundant readers and many of us, I am sure, feel the very deepest sense of obligation for the introduction which he has given us to a fresh view of the world in which we live. He has long acknowledged his indebtedness to Dr. Dewey, and it is in every way peculiarly appropriate that he should speak for us on this occasion. I have very great pleasure in presenting Dr. James Harvey Robinson.

JOHN DEWEY AND LIBERAL THOUGHT

By James Harvey Robinson
Author of *The Mind in the Making*

Mr. Chairman, Dr. Dewey, Ladies and Gentlemen: I was assigned the topic, *John Dewey and Liberal Thought,* but I took the liberty that has just been granted me by the President of Yale, and written on just what I wanted to. Indeed, you couldn't say anything about Dewey that wouldn't be a contribution to liberal thought.

Dr. Dewey has spent a good part of his life seeking a new meaning for the old word philosophy. And what is philosophy? Or, better, what has philosophy been? After years of intellectual experimentation Dewey hit upon a profound and ingenious phrase — *The Quest for Certainty.* This seems to be what philosophy has been. As he reviewed the story of thinkers from the early Greek philosophers downward to our own day he found that with few exceptions they were obsessed by a deep and primitive longing for security. They strove to arrive at some conception of the universe which would be good for all time. The true must always be true. Underlying the impermanent and accidental there was

the eternal which it was the business of the thinker to discover beneath the bewildering comings and goings of daily experience. The One must be vindicated against the disturbing Many, the Ideal against the tragic or farcical disappointments of human strivings. Even Lucretius sought safety in a frank recognition of the fortuitous concourse of atoms, for he was relieved of two great fears, that of the vengeance of the gods and of death.

My own induction into the history of "thinkers" came during my first year at Harvard when Professor George Palmer put us through that bland old book of Ferrier's on Greek philosophy. I was bewildered by the efforts of the Eleatics to prove that the idea of motion was an absurdity, and the unnatural contempt harbored for the Many, for I had not the true philosophic spirit and naïvely thought that it was the very movings of the multitudinous that gave all the zest to life. Later I happened on Plotinus and learned that "The One is not absent from anything, and yet is separated from all things; so that it is present, and yet not present with them." He who would arrive at the One "should," says Plotinus, "endeavor by separating himself from all things to be alone." It is pleasant to be alone I have found, but not at the cost of being separated from all things, even if one might thereby catch a glimpse of the utterly lonely Absolute. So while philosophy

constantly attracted me it made me uneasy, until James and Dewey explained and justified my distrust and led on to better things.

As George Mead said this morning, Dewey's newest book is peculiar in the sense of relief and emancipation which it gives one.

I hope that all of you have read *Reconstruction in Philosophy* at least a half-dozen times, since there are probably no other 213 pages which cast so much light on the trail of past thinkers. You will also be reading the Gifford Lectures, which have just appeared, so there is no call whatsoever for me to say over what Dewey himself has said. I have a different object. We are not only honoring the achievements of the chief thinker of our day but at the same time celebrating the day and generation in which it is our privilege to live. Dewey is the spokesman of our age, and it is his sensitiveness to the recent accretions of human knowledge that constitutes his peculiar distinction.

William James once casually remarked that the philosophers before Hume seemed to be running around with their trousers dangling about their heels; and even Hume says somewhere that when he put on his coat and sallied forth into the sunshine his meditations appeared remote and artificial. Dewey's philosophy on the contrary we can carry out of doors without its fading. There are some

who object to it on this very ground. To them it is too congenial to those "on the make." And yet Dewey has often met this particular criticism — and especially in his latest book.

It is what I have called the recent accretions of human knowledge which I propose to recall. They are familiar enough, but it will not be a waste of time to consider the intellectual climate in which Dewey's philosophy matured.

Philosophers have of course differed greatly from one another in their upbringing, circumstances, and the scope of their interests. All these matters we should now be disposed to take into consideration in attempting to explain their particular desire of reaching certainty. We had, for instance, this morning a very, very charming symbolic analysis of Dewey's origin. In general they agreed however, as Dewey emphasizes, in a sharp divorce of theory and practice. Like Leibnitz, they might be active men of affairs; like Aristotle, shrewdly interested in natural history, and yet exhibit the common tendency to rely almost exclusively upon discursive reason to reach and defend their fundamental conclusions. Not "discursive" like a dog trying to find something by running about, but the type of reason that stays closely at home and as Bacon says, "spins out its own web." Their worldly knowledge did not ordinarily outrun that of their educated con-

temporaries. Their heart was set on higher things. They read the books of their fellow philosophers and rejected or appropriated (often unconsciously) the teachings they found therein. In this way there was formed a philosophical tradition of the chief quandaries into which a wandering mind might fall and various recommendations for extricating itself from possible confusions. That is, there was a certain range of highly respectable questions to discuss, and they seemed to promise to exhaust the resources of the mind.

The human reason was, at least in Christian times, conceded to be finite and fallible — to be corrected and enlightened by revelation. Each philosopher could cite plenty of instances of other philosophers who did not follow out their reasoning to a "logical conclusion." But each hoped to be more successful than the last in this respect and discover impregnable arguments for his contentions.

It was pointed out this morning there is something pathetic about these systems because they did seem alive, pertinent, and revolutionary — satisfying and significant to the one who devised them. But it was, as Mr. Schneider, I think, said, practically impossible for anyone else to have the same feeling about them.

The instrument of discovery, they all agreed, was the Mind, with its faculties of understanding and

judgment. The Mind was a sort of speculative soul which every human being possessed, however badly he might manage it. Of the origin and development and nature of the Mind, the older philosophers knew nothing. I thought I would qualify that phrase, then I concluded they knew nothing, from our standpoint. It seems to us now so different from what they conceived it to be that it is no wonder that their ways of using it led them to raise many, to us, purely gratuitous problems which have ceased to be, not as a result of subtle argumentation but of increased information. Their error, as Francis Bacon said so long ago, "proceeded from a too great reverence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by means whereof, men have withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceit." They disdained "to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of God's works." "For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit."

Since Bacon's time a number of "idols of the theatre" have been fabricated, conspicuously by German thinkers from Kant to Hegel. They have received their homage and are now decaying in an uncongenial atmosphere.

One of the chronic perplexities of philosophers has always been the fitting of both *ideas* and *things* into their systems. How can any possible relation exist between Mind and Matter? A recent book, to cite a single example, (C. D. Broad's *The Mind and its Place in Nature*), ends with a list of seventeen different types of metaphysical theory regarding the relation of Mind and Matter. The writer begins with the "dualism of incompatibles," then "pure mentalism," then "pure materialism," then "emergent mentalism" and finally, number seventeen, the thesis that "Neither mentality nor materiality is a differentiating attribute, and both of them are delusive." Like a good philosopher he takes up the seventeen in order, explains the meaning of each, considering its strong and weak points, after which he judges that it may be possible "to make a tentative decision between them."

I have never had the curiosity to see what these tentative conclusions were. The author seems to be tumbling up and down in his own and others' conceits rather than spelling out and so learning to read the great book of Nature's ways. He and his

like have taken little trouble to find out what is now fairly well substantiated in regard to what he calls Mind and Matter. Had he taken the precaution to do so he could not write as he does. Let us forget about mentalism and materialism and the old notion of spiritual, and material substance shaking hands with one another over an impassable gulf. Let us eliminate the dear old conception of Mind as an entity — as what John Stuart Mill calls "the mysterious something which feels and thinks." Let us suppose that we had never been influenced by the old-fashioned philsophers and had got our ideas of man and his world exclusively from careful observation and from recent books which follow the experimental logic recommended by John Dewey as the only logic appropriate to gaining an understanding of the situation in which we find ourselves.

Our unaccustomed eyes would be blinded by the apocalyptic vision. We and our fellow men would be transformed; old miracles would pale beside new and more incredible ones; ancient perplexities would have disappeared to be replaced by greater. We would find ourselves gazing on a new earth inhabited by new creatures and surrounded by a new heaven. There would be new beauties and undreamed of possibilities "inviting to high emprise." As yet we are too bewildered, too closely bound to old valuations and loyalties, to accept the revelation. We are prone

to close our eyes in despair as our emotional foundations tremble beneath us. Even if we boldly face our new world we can see only this detail and that. We are haunted with doubts and timidities and seek sanctuary in some familiar shrine.

All this may seem a bit ecstatic, but it is not the private reverie of a mystic. It is merely a feeble hint of the possibilities which the recent acquisition of knowledge has opened to the human race. How far the possibilities will be realized no one can tell, but it is clear that man is in the way to comprehend himself and his surroundings better and better as time goes on. He has performed wonders in the past on the basis of slight knowledge, and there is no reason to suppose that he will not continue to do so on an even more magnificent scale. Every day he sees new ways of managing himself. His powers of adaptation seem illimitable — or at least no bounds can be foreseen. He lives in a world which is constantly readapting itself, and he is now coming to realize that he is a part of that world.

Now I wish your mood would be that of wondering how much you have wondered about the intercourse of mind and matter. Philosophers have been greatly troubled by it, and you have to be troubled by it, of course, in order that philosophy should become in any way interesting. I have found so many people who didn't have that absolutely nec-

essary foundation of curiosity in dealing with philosophic questions.

At any rate, the older philosophers regarded matter as dead and inert and unworthy as compared with mind — God's unique gift to man. Unlike matter it was insubstantial, without extension and impermeability, which seemed characteristic in the last analysis of material substance. This idea of matter has, as we all know, been utterly rejected by modern physicists. According to the present view, matter is made up of electrical charges arranged in various patterns constituting the known forms of atoms. These charges are of two kinds, called, after old usage, positive and negative. The negative charges are in a state of constant, incredible activity, and so are the molecules or combinations of atoms. Extension and impenetrability are then forms of activity, not "properties" in the old sense. Heat and cold are not things to be mixed in various proportions as once supposed, but can be reduced to a greater or lesser activity of the molecules. Light is not a thing but a form of activity. Eddington declares that "the atom is as porous as the solar system." "If," Eddington continues, "we eliminated all the unfilled space in a man's body and collected his protons and electrons into one mass, the man would be reduced to a speck just visible with a magnifying glass."

Thus man finds himself in a world which he can learn to modify to suit his needs. He is no longer confined to the manipulation of substances which he happened to find ready made. He can now construct molecules identical with those produced by plants and animals. He has gone much farther and created thousands of brand new substances, with which to adorn and amuse us, increase our food, relieve our ailments, and blow us to pieces when need be. It is true that synthetic chemistry antedates somewhat the present conceptions of matter, but the new insight cannot fail to increase the tractability of the world from man's standpoint.

In addition to the stupendous discovery that matter is amenable to the highest skill man can develop is the novel setting in which the present understanding places all life, including that of man himself. The ancient Hebrews made the startling discovery that man was made from the dust of the ground. For thousands of years this doctrine was held rather as a matter of faith than as a scientific fact. It has now been fully proved. Knowing as we do so much more about dust than the writer of the second chapter of Genesis, the origin of living beings seems no longer so hopelessly inscrutable as it once did. Chemical combinations to which we do not attribute life are able to accomplish strange feats, and act and react promptly to alterations in

their environment. Crystals grow and, I suppose, may be classified into genera and species, like plants and animals. We are not accustomed to say that the table is aware that I have put my hand on it, but it immediately responds when I do. Its molecules come a little closer together and begin to move faster than before. The table is composed of molecules formed by the action of the sun's rays on the chemical combination which constituted the chlorophyl in the leaves of a tree.

It is very hard then to draw any clear line between "dead" and "living" matter. It is a great relief not to have to do so. I have no desire to say anything about what is misleadingly called the "mechanistic" theory. I am intent on emphasizing the fact that we no longer have to do with things and beings, as conceived in former times, but with doings, since things and beings are now seen to be fleeting situations or events which happen rather than are. We may recall here Dewey's statement of the stubborn reluctance of man to accept and live into this new view of all things. "The human mind," he says "deliberately, as it were, exhausted the logic of the changeless, the final, and the transcendent, before it essayed adventure on the pathless wastes of generation and transformation." And his latest book is one more attempt to reconcile us to this novel and disquieting view.

What has been said prepares the way for a new conception of mind, its origin, nature, and operation. Men have always been wont to talk in terms of soul and body or mind and body. Very intelligent persons continue to do so, even when they concede that mind and body are very intimately associated with one another. We seem to have in us something which orders the body about. The mind plans, the judgment decides, and the will gives the requisite commands. This is the natural assumption and forms the basis of personal responsibility and current morality. It is on this understanding that we pass judgment on our own conduct and that of others. To question this "self-evident" truth would seem to augur nothing less than an onset of ruthless self-indulgence and the ultimate "dissolution of society." There are a few nowadays who are beginning to see that this is an erroneous statement of the case. They exhibit, however, no tendency to licentiousness or to a disregard of their neighbors. They do few of the bad things so common among those who stanchly adhere to the old sanctions of conduct. It is indeed their ardent hope that a truer understanding of human action will ultimately greatly improve the ways of man. Dewey has devoted a whole volume to the attempt to wean us from our old crude notions of morality, but the debauchee will find no solace in his pages.

The chief function of philosophy as Dewey sees it, is to show us how to think and talk in a profitable manner comformable to the information we now have (which should constantly be increased) about ourselves and our world. Now we have learned that unintermitting action and change are the fundamental characteristics of the world and all things thereon. Everywhere and always there is movement. So the first measure in remodelling our thinking and talking is to supplant with verbs some of the substantives we have been prone to use, since what were once supposed to be substances turn out to be results of activity. The noun "mind" is derived from a verb "to mind." This verb may mean remember, take note of, be concerned about. We perceive ourselves doing these things, but we have no justification for thinking that there is a spiritual substance that does them.

As James says, it is something like our saying, *it* rains or *it* snows, and as he long ago pointed out, the subject of the sentence seems to be a case of that impersonal grammatical construction which doesn't commit you to feeling that "it" means anything at all.

This turning of nouns into verbs may seem at first a sort of quibble but on the contrary it is absolutely essential in order to understand what man has hitherto called his mind and the relation it bears

to his body. This will become apparent immediately.

I suppose that there is no one here who does not believe that he is an animal, but I also imagine that very few of us see half the implications of this fact. Supposing that just before we arose in the morning we added a little orison to those suggested by Marcus Aurelius. "I am an animal; I was a little time ago a baby. I may hope to escape babyishness in some measure, but never shall cease to be an animal; that is a wonder of wonders."

It is customary now to speak of the "animal mind" or, much better, of "animal intelligence." There are many earnest investigators engaged in revealing the foundations of human understanding. I can only hint here of the way in which the major mystery of mind has been attenuated.

All animals perceive, in the sense of acting in accordance to changes in themselves and their environment. I am inclined to think that they are not conscious of this awareness, but they act as if they were. Our terminology is as yet inadequate, but we know well enough that we can readjust ourselves, let us say to uncomfortable positions, with no consciousness of what we are doing. Of course almost all of our physiological processes are based upon this unconscious animal awareness, and do not rise above what is called the threshold of conscious-

ness. Digestion, the pumping of the heart, the supply and distribution of the multiform white blood corpuscles, the ductless glands, are sensitive to various stimuli, act purposefully but happily escape any bungling conscious control on our part. A conscious condition or act is one of which we are aware that we are aware. We haven't any way of saying it yet, but it seems so very clear to me that what we call consciousness is nothing more than a more acute or poignant form of an awareness we find in all life.

It is now possible to trace, at least in a rough way, the emergence of this superawareness which is essential to thinking. In order that a man should become conscious he had to be just a little different anatomically from his nearest relatives. The various sounds he was able to make were first used "instrumentally" as Dewey would say, not as a means of conveying ideas, as once supposed. But as time went on, speech and the capacity to name things gave greater and greater clarity to man's impressions and memories and thus raised them from merely animal awareness to the super or conscious awareness which permitted thinking and planning to begin. A great deal could be said on this. It is something you can all readily illustrate for yourselves by observation and considering — watching the number of things you are aware of and yet are not con-

sciously aware of and how that number can be increased in certain ways and how by habituation a number of things you do are reduced to the mere animal awareness.

Wundt declared that there could be no thinking without words, and it would seem that, with the very slightest possible reservations, this is true. But words finally got the bit in their teeth and have run away with both the thinking and the unthinking, with the learned and the unlearned — and perhaps they ran farther and faster with the philosophers than anybody else.

This is a most shockingly inadequate account of the setting of Dewey's thinking. The hour-glass has run out and most of the things I had hoped to say must be left to you to add. Philosophers may, as in the new book by Alexander Herzberg, be viewed from the standpoint of their obvious weaknesses, which are apparent enough, or from the standpoint of their ideals. Dewey in reviewing their doctrines has a characteristic anxiety to put theories with which he heartily disagrees in the best light. This is not vulgar tolerance, which, as has recently been pointed out to me, means "Although I am quite convinced that I am right I won't say ugly things about you because you are wrong." That is, there is some kind of ugly condescension in toleration, after all, as it is commonly used. I

suspect that Dewey would agree that when we consider the whole development of civilization, its ideals, knowledge, skill, and art, we owe far more to prophets, scientists, technicians, men of letters and artists than to philosophers. It is this very fact that has led him to criticize the older philosophic ambitions and recommend methods of thought that have proved abundantly fruitful. For we are in dire need of those who can survey the whole range of human endeavor with a sort of detached ardor which is not restricted to a special field of knowledge or research. There must be what Bacon called "Interpreters of Nature" in the widest sense of the term — those who devote themselves to reconciling men to intelligence, by revealing, for instance the suspicious manner in which our convictions are formed, especially in childhood. Only one school of philosophy, that represented by Cicero, has ever declared it a glory to change one's mind. Dewey sees that philosophers should justify their existence by showing us how to think of things in terms of progressive exploration rather than how they must be. Nothing on the face of it can be more suspicious than the congenial *a priori* judgments of a super-animal and ex-baby.

The strong appeal that Dewey makes to those interested in widely different problems and to the thoughtful in far-off lands, indicates that he per-

sonally exemplifies and illustrates the very qualities that his philosophy sets up as ideals of emulation. He either says something or keeps still. He listens patiently to your prattle and gives you the precious feeling that you are furnishing him with all sorts of entirely novel ideas. His own would seem to be mere commonplaces hardly worth uttering. This is no affectation of humility, derived from maxims of Benjamin Franklin. He knows his universe so well that there is no dogmatism in him. He does not even have to say to himself, "Who am I to be explaining just how things really are," in order to check the delightful exuberance of confident assertion.

I shall leave it to Mr. Lovett to say better than I can these last words about Dewey: "His faith in human nature, in its capacity for development through education, for collective action through democracy, for making the world a different place in which to live through art, is a cause of faith in others, as his works are examples to them. In the presence of John Dewey the most timid is ashamed to flinch, the least hopeful to despair."

CHAIRMAN ANGELL: I had promised myself the pleasure of speaking very briefly about Dr. Dewey's powers as a teacher — to which I could not do full justice — but I had planned to tell you some stories

which I think would have entertained you if not instructed you, and which at least would have given me an opportunity to pay my tribute to his extraordinary traits as a teacher. But the hour has grown late and you are all impatient to hear Dr. Dewey himself, and I present him at once therefore, great philosopher, great educator, great liberal, great citizen, our friend, John Dewey!

IN RESPONSE

By John Dewey
Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University

Mrs. Swan, Mr. Chairman, Miss Addams and Friends:

Of course I am very, very deeply touched by all of the expressions which have come to me in the last few days. Some of them have been somewhat exaggerated, but I will not claim that I have not been gratified even by these exaggerations; in fact, in the colloquial, I have lapped them up. At the same time I know that there have been some who were slightly skeptical or more than slightly, about some of these expressions and I should like to reassure them by saying that I share their skepticism.

I had a letter from a friend in which she said that if I betook too freely from the frosting of the cake that I might learn something new about the relations of experience and nature. I took it that the remarks applied even more to the spiritual frosting which has decorated these occasions than to this beautiful material frosting.

As I listened to the discussion last evening, I was reminded of a story, an episode that happened either many thousand years ago or on an-

other planet, I am not quite sure which, about a man who was somewhat sensitive to the movements of things about him. He had a certain appreciation of what things were passing away and dying and of what things were being born and growing. And on the strength of that response he foretold some of the things that were going to happen in the future. When he was seventy years old the people gave him a birthday party and they gave him credit for bringing to pass the things that he had foreseen might come to pass. He fooled himself somewhat by being told these things, but he didn't fool himself very much. But he had a very good time and he hoped that everybody else had had a good time too.

There is one thing about which I am not at all skeptical and that is the expressions of friendship, of kindliness and affection which have come to me. I wish that I could thank personally those from whom they have come, not merely those who have spoken, but those who have sent their messages in other ways. I cannot thank each one individually but I do want to thank very especially those who have come from other places to be present on this occasion — to my old student, President Angell, who perhaps, though you wouldn't think it to look at him, is the earliest and in that sense the oldest of my former students probably who is here today; to Director Carroll Moore, also a former student and

now the Director of the University of California in Los Angeles; and to my old time colleague and friend, though not student, George Mead of Chicago, and naturally Jane Addams of Chicago, as well as Professor Ralph Perry of Harvard University. If I mention these people it is not because I do not also appreciate the words that have come from my nearer neighbors here.

It would be ungracious not to thank also the Executive Committee, the Chairman, Mrs. Swan, the other members. Acknowledgments are due also to one who today is in the Orient, but who as Chairman of the Executive Committee was a prime mover in making the arrangements for these meetings — Professor Kilpatrick. And I am sure that they would agree with me that the Executive Secretary Henry Linville, deserves mention. I am not sure, Henry, that my gratitude on this occasion to you is entirely unalloyed, but at the same time I am glad to have the privilege of expressing publicly my admiration for your courageous and unwearied and self-effacing activities in so many other good causes.

I am grateful to speakers that they have so largely talked about movements and ideas in which we share a common interest and by the side of which any personality is relatively unimportant. There is no occasion for me, however, to repeat or review what they have said, and it would be impossible to add any-

thing at this time about the ideas, the movements and the causes themselves. You will, I am sure, understand however that it was natural for me after having my attention called somewhat emphatically and numerously to the fact that I was seventy years old, — I don't suppose I can conceal the fact now, — that I should have made some survey in my own mind of the conditions through which our contemporaries have lived in these recent years. If I have done so it is not for the purpose of indulging in the privilege of old age and engaging in reminiscences on this occasion, though I do wish there were time for me to express my debt of grateful piety to the teachers and colleges, that have so deeply influenced me from the very time when I came to that institution in Vermont to which James Angell has referred. I must, however, forego that. But my consciousness of my deep indebtedness to these multitudes of people, many of whom today I am afraid I could not even name, has been one of the things that has convinced me that there is nothing so important in life as the free, unobstructed communication of ideas and experiences and their transmission from one to another, without any kind of restriction, censorship, or intimidation — legal, political, or extralegal.

For some reason, possibly through a conversation recently with a friend, my mind in going back over

these years and wondering what they were all about, in what direction they were tending, has taken the form of thinking somewhat about the conditions of happiness in life. I know very well that one cannot generalize from any individual case of a reasonably happy life because fortune, because something that we must frankly call luck, the chance coincidences of life, play such a large, unavoidable part in the enjoyment of happiness.

One of the conditions of happiness is the opportunity of a calling, a career which somehow is congenial to one's own temperament. And I have had the sheer luck or fortune to be engaged in the occupation of thinking; and while I am quite regular at my meals I think that I may say that I had rather work — and perhaps even more play — with ideas and with thinking than eat. That chance has been given me.

The other and deepest source of happiness in life comes to one, I suppose, from one's own family relations; and there too, though I have experienced great sorrows, I can truly say that in my life companion, in my children, and in my grandchildren, I have been blessed by the circumstances and fortunes of life.

There are other things of happiness, however, which are not so personal, which do depend more upon conditions that are within our control. And

I wish to speak very briefly, if I may, upon some of those.

It seems to me that probably the greatest enemy to what is attainable in happiness in the life of human beings is the attitude of fear. Fear is an unfortunate word, like all words that have to carry important ideas and emotions. It suggests something that we consciously feel in emergencies, and which is not very important unless very extreme. What I have in mind is rather an unconscious attitude which runs through and pervades everything of which we are conscious. It is not so much fear in the ordinary sense as it is an attitude of withdrawal, an attitude of exclusiveness which shuts out the beauties and troubles of experience as the things from which we alone can really learn and go on growing. It is even possible to get rid of fears of specific things and still retain a kind of underlying fear of fear itself.

This attitude of fear cannot be abolished by any direct attack. It can be expelled only by the power of another and more positive attitude and emotion, that of going out to and welcoming all of the incidents of a changing experience, even those which in themselves are troublesome. I might call it the open mind, only perhaps that suggests too much a vacant mind, a sort of "Come right in; you are welcome; there is nobody at home." Well, in reality the open mind is this positive attitude of interest,

so far as one's limitations do at times permit, in all of the concerns of our common humanity.

I have learned many things from Jane Addams. I notice that with her usual modesty she attributed to me some of the things in Chicago which she and her colleagues in Hull House did. One of the things that I have learned from her is the enormous value of mental non-resistance, of tearing away the armor-plate of prejudice, of convention, isolation that keeps one from sharing to the full in the larger and even the more unfamiliar and alien ranges of the possibilities of human life and experience.

I suppose there are a certain number of younger people here who have in mind engaging in a calling something like my own; that is, working mostly at ideas and not much at anything else — in other words, the educators whether in the schoolroom or pulpit or wherever. I should like to say to them that I think the most inexpensive, the most easily attained source of happiness in what we call a specialized intellectual class, is found simply in this broadening of intellectual curiosity and sympathy in all the concerns of life. You don't really have to do much about it, as my own experience testifies. You only have to show some intellectual interest in these things to find an ever-growing source of satisfaction in life. While everything that shuts the individual off, shuts his mind, his ideas off, from

other things, ends by petrifying his mind and his experience and drying up the very sources of happiness within him.

The greatest evil, it seems to me, in our American life, even greater than fear — and one which is the cause of innumerable anxieties, worries and fretting, that which most prevents us from realizing the possibilities of life — is our externalism. I have never thought that the average American has any more love for the dollar as such than the average Frenchman for the franc, or the average German for the mark, — in fact I came near saying *sou* and *pfennig*, — but external opportunities so abound in our American life that instead of nurturing the sources of happiness we tend to make happiness a direct pursuit; and the direct pursuit of happiness always ends in looking for happiness in possesions, in possessions of what is external, in having something whether in having a good time, having money, having a multitude of material things, or having someone else to lean upon for our ideas. We pursue happiness in these external things because, I suppose, we do not really possess our own souls. We are impatient; we are hurried; we are fretful because we try to find happiness where it cannot be got. Some of us are, indeed, as much in a hurry for reforms as other people are in a hurry for speed in physical movement. Without knowing it, we dis-

trust the slow processes of growth, and we do not tend the roots of life from which a lasting happiness springs.

Our present American ideal seems to be, "Put it over — and make it snappy while you do it." I do not imagine that state of things will endure forever. Mere fatigue and sheer disappointment will bring it to an end sometime. But in the meantime we need a revival of faith in individuality and what belongs to the internal springs and sources of individuality. Only a return to that individuality, which after all is what each of us is, will bring calm, repose, and a sense of beauty in the multitude of distractions of our modern life and action.

The world is either a wonderful scene or a dismal one according to whether we bring wonder with us to it or whether we bring with us the desire to possess as much of it as possible in as short a time as possible. What we bring to the world in which we live always has and always will, at last, go back to the depths of our own being. I see, however, that I am in danger of falling into too sermonic a mood — and, as one of our speakers this morning reminded us, after all this is supposed to be a celebration.

So I can only close by saying that I cannot do less again than thank you. Not being gifted with the tongues of angels I cannot either do more — but I do thank you from my heart.

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John Dewey, the man and his philosophy;

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